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STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE
Kelli A. Alces*

Creditors exercise significant power over financially distressed corporations,
thereby pushing corporate managers further into the realm of unprofitable risk
aversion. The heavy hand of creditor power and the threats creditors are able to
make to managers’ professional stability and success misalign senior officers’
incentives by undermining their freedom to make wealth-maximizing decisions on
behalf of the corporation. The importance of independent managerial decision
making is paramount in the law of corporate governance and that independence
has been inefficiently undermined by the exertion of oppressive creditor control.
This Article resolves the problem by creating a mechanism to balance shareholder
and creditor influence over management so that no one constituent is able to
dominate or undermine the independence of managerial decision making. A new
shareholder representative called an “equity trustee” will represent shareholder
interests during times of financial distress. The equity trustee gives voice to
shareholder preferences in times when creditors are likely to dictate terms of
governance so that the creditor voice does not grow too strong. The equity trustee
should serve to balance competing preferences so that managers maintain
independence and the ability to make value-maximizing decisions without fear of
destructive retribution from either shareholders or creditors.

INTRODUCTION
Once a corporation is at risk of defaulting on major bank loans, an effective
change in control occurs, and the mechanisms that tied the managers’ interests to
those of the corporation through the interests of shareholders fail.1 The traditional
mechanisms of fiduciary duties and incentive compensation are inadequate when it
*
Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. I am
grateful for helpful comments from and conversations with Professors Robin Craig, Brian
Galle, Jonathan Klick, James Park, Gregg Polsky, Larry Ribstein, Mark Seidenfeld, David
Skeel, Lois Shepherd, and participants in the FSU Faculty Enrichment Series Workshop, the
2008 Law & Society Conference, and the 2008 SEALS Young Scholars’ Workshop. Special
thanks go to Melissa Murphy for valuable research assistance.
1.
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1228–29 (2006) (arguing that
when a corporation falters, the ability of institutional lenders and creditors to control the
cash flow of the corporation is a “potent threat” and managers will respond by shifting their
loyalties away from the corporation and toward the creditors and lenders who have
significant influence over the corporation).
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comes to giving the managers2 of troubled companies wealth-maximizing
incentives. During this tumultuous time, the shareholders’ limited power over the
firm’s management pales in comparison to the sword the company’s institutional
lenders can wield against the senior officers, the directors, and even the
corporation itself.3 Deference to creditors in a time of financial difficulty, no
matter how severe, is neither necessarily the path to corporate wealth
maximization nor consistent with the tenets of corporate law.4 When the
corporation is in financial trouble, the shareholder voice is often silenced. This
weakening of the shareholder position, combined with the extreme power creditors
may exercise over managers when the corporation is insolvent, leads to a level of
risk aversion5 that may not result in wealth-maximizing decisions on the
corporation’s behalf. Because the managers can never be sure of precisely where
they are in the solvency spectrum, adopting the course of action preferred by either
the shareholders or creditors will not necessarily guarantee that the managers will
make the decision or adopt the level of risk that is best for the firm. Neither
constituent can be relied upon to advocate consistently for positions that would
lead to wealth-maximizing behavior. The best way to address this problem is to
balance the amount of influence each group can exert over corporate managers
throughout the life of the firm.
Contrary to the supposition of many judicial decisions6 and much of the
scholarship7 in recent years, the problem is not one of fiduciary duties or of a

2.
Throughout this Article, the term “managers” refers to a corporation’s senior
officers.
3.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1231.
4.
It is axiomatic that a solvent corporation is to be operated for the benefit of
its shareholders. Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate
Duty to Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1384 (2007) (explaining that the corporation
is owned by the shareholders and they possess economic and voting rights in the
corporation).
5.
A risk-averse person is one who “considers the utility of a certain prospect of
money income to be higher than the expected utility of an uncertain prospect of equal
expected monetary value.” ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 51
(2004). For example, a risk-averse person would prefer a situation in which she was
guaranteed a return of $25 to one where she had a 25% chance of receiving $100 even
though the expected monetary value of each is $25. See AVINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH,
GAMES OF STRATEGY 174 (1999).
6.
See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. Inc. v. Gheewalla,
930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007); Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del.
Ch. 2004); Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386 (Del. Ch. 1999); Geyer v.
Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).
7.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors’
Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 336 (2007); Hu &
Westbrook, supra note 4; Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency:
Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1993); Jonathan C.
Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed
Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein & Kelli A. Alces, Directors’
Duties in Failing Firms, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 529, 529 (2007).
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particular “zone of insolvency”;8 rather, it is one of properly aligning managerial
incentives at all levels of financial success and difficulty. Creditors and scholars
alike have framed the problem of conflicting shareholder and creditor interests as
one that plagues only corporations within the “zone of insolvency,” because of the
perceived shift in the fiduciary duties directors owe once a corporation is
insolvent.9 The debate has lasted several years and was originally born of the
understanding that directors owed fiduciary duties to the firm’s creditors in
insolvency. Creditors sought to extend the duties owed during insolvency to
something they referred to as the “zone of insolvency.”10 Dicta in some Delaware
cases muddied the waters by seemingly assuming, without holding, that such a
duty to creditors does exist.11 Legal scholars took up the interesting and puzzling
question of how to treat directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency, a time when
the directors still owe fiduciary duties to shareholders and the corporation, but
must also address a loyalty claimed by creditors of the troubled company.12
Because the exact point of insolvency is very difficult to determine, directors are
faced with the problem of not quite knowing when and how their loyalties are
supposed to shift. Several commentators concluded that the business judgment rule
protects directors from liability for mistaking whose interests to prefer as between
creditors and shareholders.13 Directors owe duties to the corporation itself, within
8.
The “zone of insolvency” is most commonly used to refer to that time in a
corporation’s life when insolvency is imminent. Because it is not possible to determine the
exact moment a corporation becomes insolvent, courts and creditors speak of the “zone of
insolvency” when talking about the time during which a switch to creditor preferences may
be appropriate. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 94. In this Article, I expand the definition of this
“zone” to include the time when the corporation is in serious financial trouble, such that
default on loan obligations is highly probable. The likelihood of default increases the
likelihood of insolvency because one default may result in a domino effect by constituting a
default on other obligations. If the corporation is in default on all of its loans, all of its
creditors will be able to demand immediate payment in full and those demands may
inevitably lead to the company’s insolvency.
9.
Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1339–43. “Zone of insolvency” is difficult
to define. That difficulty makes rules dependent on it impractical. The supposition that the
rules or methods of corporate governance should change upon the perceived imminence of
insolvency is simply wrong, as demonstrated by recent court decisions, and leads scholars to
devise arbitrary and impractical solutions. See, e.g., Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101, 103
(holding that only actual insolvency will allow creditors to sue derivatively for breach of
fiduciary duty by directors and that creditors have a direct action for breach of fiduciary
duty in bankruptcy); Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 536 (This article argues that
increased fiduciary duties owed to creditors in failing firms is unnecessary. Rather, the
business judgment rule should apply to decisions made by the debtor and a “strong duty of
loyalty is appropriate only when the agent delegates open-ended discretion to the
principal.”); Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1321 (arguing for the abolition of insolvency
as the measure for duty shifting and instead using bankruptcy as the measure).
10.
See, e.g., Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 94; Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 772;
Odyssey, 735 A.2d at 386; Geyer, 621 A.2d at 784.
11.
Geyer, 621 A.2d at 787–91; Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 529.
12.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 7; Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4; Lin,
supra note 7; Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7.
13.
Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 366–67; Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 536–
37; see also Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No.
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or without insolvency.14 This inquiry into directors’ duties in a distressed firm has
been valuable and has brought attention to an important problem in corporate
governance. Still, the inquiry has not resolved the issue of conflicting shareholder
and creditor preferences and influence in financially unstable firms. It has so far
failed in that attempt, not for lack of reasoning or creativity, but because it asks the
wrong question. Addressing the problem through personal liability for breach of
fiduciary duty by corporate directors without considering the incentives of the
firm’s senior officers—its most prominent, everyday decision makers—misses the
most important aspect of a corporate manager’s internal conflict during the zone of
insolvency.
The focus on fiduciary duties is particularly misplaced when addressing
the incentives of corporate managers. Fiduciary duties are one way to exercise
control over directors’ decisions by threatening punishment ex post, but suits for
breach of fiduciary duty, particularly those brought derivatively by shareholders,
do not often result in judgments against corporate directors.15 Procedural
anomalies under Delaware law make it almost impossible to reach corporate
officers in derivative suits alleging breach of fiduciary duty.16 Protections for
directors are intentionally built into the derivative suit mechanism so that directors
will feel free to take beneficial risks on behalf of the corporation.17 Chief among
these protections is the business judgment rule, which shields directors from
personal liability for informed decisions made in good faith that the director
rationally believed to be in the best interests of the corporation.18 A corporate
officer or director could make a decision that honors either shareholder or creditor
preferences without exceeding the bounds of proper business judgment and
thereby subjecting herself to personal liability for breach of fiduciary duty.19 Even
12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); see infra note 19 and
accompanying text.
14.
Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55; Ribstein & Alces, supra
note 7, at 538.
15.
See Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the
Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 261, 271 (1986).
16.
See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 905 (2003).
17.
See William T. Quillen, The Federal–State Corporate Law Relationship–A
Response to Professor Seligman’s Call for Federal Preemption of State Corporate
Fiduciary Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 107, 118–19 (1993) (stating that the decision in Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), “discourag[ed] qualified outsiders from serving on
corporate boards . . . because the risk of personal liability . . . was not worth the reward of
serving on a corporate board”).
18.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[The business judgment
rule] is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company.”).
19.
See Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55. Chancellor Allen used
the example of a solvent corporation with a $12 million debt whose only asset is a $51
million judgment with an expected value of $15.5 million which takes into account the
chances of the judgment being affirmed, modified, or reversed on appeal. The Chancellor
found that creditors would accept a settlement offer over $12 million, but shareholders
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well-meaning managers making business decisions on behalf of the corporation in
good faith will be pulled in different directions according to the power
shareholders can exert over corporate management and any loan terms that may
serve to grant creditors eventual control.
This Article addresses that internal struggle confronting managers. The
competing interests vying for managerial favor in the zone of insolvency can
indeed prove costly for the corporation, but this struggle does not involve an
actionable breach of fiduciary duty. Rather, it is the consequence of personal
incentives operating on managers who are making good faith decisions that would
pass muster when held up to the business judgment standard. A focus on assigning
liability for breach of fiduciary duty is not only inefficient and completely
ineffective in most instances; it does not solve the real problem that confronts
corporate managers even when the corporation is indubitably solvent—what
investment strategy to use when the corporation is in a financially precarious
position.
The conflict between shareholder and creditor interests that weighs on
management is not necessarily caused by a fundamental uncertainty about which
course of action is best for the corporation. The business decision may be difficult,
but it is one corporate managers could make in a relative vacuum in which they
could conceive of a “corporate” good without regard to a “shareholder good” or
“creditor good.”20 The corporate managers’ personal interests necessarily guide

could reject a higher settlement because of the chance that the initial $51 million judgment
would be affirmed. The Chancellor explained that:
[I]f we consider the community of interests that the corporation
represents it seems apparent that one should in this hypothetical
accept the best settlement offer available providing it is greater than
$15.55 million, and one below that amount should be rejected. But
that result will not be reached by a director who thinks he owes duties
directly to shareholders only. It will be reached by directors who are
capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and economic
entity. Such directors will recognize that in managing the business
affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency,
circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient and the
fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice
that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single
group interested in the corporation) would make if given the
opportunity to act.
Id.; Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 538 (arguing that shifting fiduciary
duties during insolvency creates a dilemma between the demands of creditors
and shareholders with risks for both constituencies. Further, a “judicially
imposed duty” would create uncertainty because of the “difficulty of defining
. . . the ‘zone’ of insolvency.”).
20.
Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55. Henry Hu has disputed the
clear existence of a “corporate good,” arguing that many difficult decisions do not present
themselves as being clearly risk averse or risk seeking and for which the wealth maximizing
answer is not clear. Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate
Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 318–32 (1990). Even Hu acknowledges that a greater
risk preference on the part of corporate managers would be healthy pre-bankruptcy. Id. at
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the decision they make on behalf of the corporation. Those personal interests are
not the sort of self interests whose indulgence would constitute a breach of
fiduciary duty. Rather, they are a necessary part of aligning the interests of
corporate managers with those of the firm’s owners, a crucial mechanism used to
reduce the agency costs inherent in the separation of ownership and control that
defines the corporate form.21 These are the personal interests that we must balance
and conquer if we are to increase the likelihood that managers make the value
maximizing decision. The key is to balance the influences shareholders and
creditors may each exert over management so that neither party is so
overwhelming as to compromise the independent decision making abilities of the
company’s officers.
The answer is to provide shareholders a voice to advance the shareholder
position up to and through insolvency, and so to create a party that has an incentive
to advocate shareholder interests when major corporate debt decisions are made
and while the corporation is in financial trouble. This “equity trustee” would
represent shareholder interests in negotiating loan terms, inform and advise
shareholders about how to use their voting power during times of financial
distress, and have the power to bring lawsuits in the shareholders’ stead. Loan
covenants in the loan agreements and the significant collateral taken to secure
some of the enormous loans banks make to corporations allow dominant creditors
to coerce the managers of a troubled company into taking the steps these creditors
prefer.22 Once we have reached the point at which the corporation is vulnerable to
creditor threats, it is too late to make a principled stand against powerful creditors,
particularly at a time when the shareholders have little or no incentive to exert
energy or resources to affect corporate action. The problem must be adequately
anticipated and planned for ex ante in a way that does not assume away
shareholder interests in times of financial distress. These interests can provide a
balance against the extreme risk aversion that is prevalent around the zone of
insolvency and, therefore, lead to greater corporate wealth maximization. As long
as the firm is planning to reorganize rather than liquidate, equity prefers wealth
generation beyond what is needed to repay creditors. That should be recognized
and honored.
This Article advances the literature by breaking with a significant body of
scholarship that approaches the problem as one of misplaced fiduciary duties,23
and offers an alternative for how best to align managerial incentives through
incentive compensation both in and out of bankruptcy.24 Those who have noted the
330 n.145 (“When a corporation seems headed for bankruptcy, it may be shareholderoptimal for a manager to engage in risk-seeking behavior.”).
21.
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308
(1976).
22.
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1211.
23.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 7; Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4; Lin,
supra note 7; Lipson, supra note 7; Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 529.
24.
See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive
Compensation When Agency Costs are Low, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1543 (2007); Yair
Listokin, Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy: Why CEOs Should Be Compensated with
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effects of enhanced institutional creditor control in the zone of insolvency have
stopped short of deciding whether the phenomenon is a problem.25 This Article
demonstrates that creditor control poses a threat to corporate wealth maximization
and, further, suggests a novel solution that vindicates the corporate law priority of
managerial independence under the sole supervision of the board of directors.
Others who have looked at officer incentive problems in the zone of insolvency
have turned to traditional mechanisms such as incentive compensation to find an
answer.26 This Article explains why such an approach may be inadequate and
shows how a process that encourages open bargaining between parties with
relevant interests better minimizes the agency costs associated with managerial
decision making in financially distressed firms.
Solving problems of misaligned managerial incentives with the limited
use of a new shareholder representative is a project that has many parts. This
Article is but the first necessary step in a larger project aimed at creating the equity
trustee and defining the exact circumstances of its most beneficial use. Future
research will more fully develop the innovation and will explore insights into how
the equity trustee would affect corporate governance as a whole and what
implications the use of such a trustee could have throughout the life of a
corporation. This Article begins the project by elucidating the problem confronting
managers in the zone of insolvency for the first time in a way that shows the
problem to be one of incentives and the effects of creditor control, and not one of
breached fiduciary duties. It illustrates how an equity trustee would be an effective
tool in solving the problem at hand.
In Part I, the Article will look at shareholder influence over the
management of a healthy corporation. It describes the preferences held by
shareholders and tools at their disposal to influence managerial decision making.
Part II then explains how creditor power reserved through loan covenants strongly
influences managers and makes them even more risk-averse in troubled times than
they are when the corporation is comfortably solvent. Part III demonstrates that
this strong deference to the power of creditors applies not only when the
corporation is insolvent, but also in healthier times when the chance of financial
difficulty may loom on the horizon. Part IV examines the internal struggle
managers face in appropriately balancing the competing interests of shareholders
and creditors in order to make the best decision for the corporation while avoiding
harm to their personal interests and livelihood. It shows how this struggle begins
with the negotiation of a loan agreement and ends in misaligned incentives when
the corporation is in financial trouble. Having established in Part IV why the
current system is flawed, the Article in Part V considers how best to solve the
problem. Part V defines the role and expected efficacy of an equity trustee, and
explains how the limited use of an equity trustee may counter overwhelming
creditor interests and afford managers more freedom to make the decisions most
likely to lead to wealth maximization. Part V also explains why other attempts to
Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (2007); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 920 (2003).
25.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1250.
26.
See Henderson, supra note 24; Listokin, supra note 24; Skeel, supra note 24,
at 920.
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address this problem have fallen short, and why the equity trustee is a superior
solution.

I. SHAREHOLDER PREFERENCES AND INFLUENCE
Corporate law has well established that a corporation’s management owes
its loyalties to shareholders.27 Shareholders own the company. Much of modern
corporate law and scholarship has focused on the agency problem resulting from
the separation of the ownership and control of a corporation, identified by Adolf
A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means over seventy-five years ago.28 The solutions to
the problem have sought to align management’s interests with those of
shareholders, by imposing legal obligations on managers and giving them
incentives to operate the company in the best interests of its collective, and often
widely dispersed, owners.29 Directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation,
enforceable by shareholders, to manage the business in a manner they “reasonably
believe[] to be in the best interests of the corporation”30 and, through the
corporation, its shareholders.31 When a corporation is solvent, its shareholders are
the clear beneficiaries of the fiduciary duties owed to the firm by management.32
These fiduciary duties work largely to constrain the behavior of directors, but their
relevance to senior officers is murky at best.33 Shareholders cling tenaciously to
the fiduciary duties directors owe, although it is not clear at all that these duties are
effective in ensuring that those who are truly responsible for managing the
corporation do so in a manner that comports with the preferences of its equity
holders.

27.
Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1356 (“[T]he directors owe fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.” (quoting Paramount
Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994))).
28.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1214 (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)).
29.
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW & ECONOMICS 408–09 (2002).
30.
REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2007).
31.
Paramount Commc’ns, 637 A.2d at 43; Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at
1356 (citing REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) official cmt. n.2 (2005)).
32.
These fiduciary obligations exist because shareholders delegate open-ended
control over the corporation to its directors. Such wide discretion requires a fiduciary
standard to align the agent directors’ incentives with those of the principals, the
shareholders. See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209,
217 (2005) (“[A] fiduciary duty is appropriate only where the owner delegates open-ended
power to the manager . . . [a] [c]lassic example[] where the costs are justified include[s] the
relationship between management and dispersed owners in a traditional publicly held
corporation . . . .”).
33.
See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, Corporate Governance and the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act: The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1149, 1194, 1225 (2004); Thompson & Sale, supra note 16, at 905 (explaining that
federal law is currently attempting to fill in some of the gaps in Delaware law relating to the
ability to impose liability and maintain “suits for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care”).
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A. Diversification and Risk Preferences
The agency costs inherent in the separation of ownership and control will
not completely disappear under any compensation scheme.34 Well-diversified
shareholders will never be able to bring managers’ incentives and goals for
managing the corporation completely in line with their own. For one thing,
shareholders own very small pieces of a number of companies and so are more or
less equally invested in varying firms and industries.35 Senior officers, by
definition, have a far greater investment in the one firm. They only have one job
and professional reputation to protect. Future employment and compensation
prospects depend on the perceived success of the firm they manage.36 A senior
officer may lose his job at the hands of unhappy board members whose continued
service on the board is thrown into question by the corporation’s lack of success,37
or he may be unseated at the behest of influential bank creditors.38 Even if the
officer is not removed immediately after the firm’s change in fortune, the market
for corporate control will know of his failure and it may be difficult, if not
impossible (depending on the size of the business failure), for him to secure a
similar position at a corporation of similar stature.39 The manager’s very
livelihood, then, and often a substantial portion of his wealth, is tied up in the
corporation’s success. This significant personal investment makes managers less
willing to cause the corporation to make the high risk investments or decisions that
may lead to proportionately higher returns that shareholders would like.40

34.
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 21, at 308 (“[I]t is generally impossible
for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal
decisions from the principal’s viewpoint.”).
35.
See Hu, supra note 20, at 319 (“A shareholder typically can diversify away
much of the risk associated with any single corporation through the simple expedient of
holding a portfolio of stocks.”).
36.
Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1351 (“A shareholder has shares in many
companies; a manager has only one job. Moreover, from stock options and other securities
holdings, managers are typically poorly diversified.”).
37.
Shareholders cannot remove underperforming officers directly. The senior
officers of a corporation are chosen by its directors who are elected by shareholders. If
shareholders want to remove an officer from his position, they must exert pressure on the
board of directors or install a new board that will choose different officers. See BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 29, at 441 (“Shareholders have virtually no right to initiate corporate action and,
moreover, are entitled to approve or disapprove only a very few board actions.”). The
shareholders thus do not have a right to remove officers of the corporation and as
individuals have only limited power to exert pressure on the board of directors.
38.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1244–45.
39.
See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 921, 931–32 (2007).
40.
See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 21. This article develops a
theory of the ownership structure of the firm. Jensen & Meckling explain that as the owner–
manager’s equity decreases:
his incentive to devote significant effort to creative activities such as
searching out new profitable ventures falls. He may in fact avoid such
ventures simply because it requires too much trouble or effort on his part
to manage or to learn about new technologies. Avoidance of these
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This agency problem means that managers are more risk-averse than
shareholders would prefer when it comes to making decisions about how to run the
corporation. Managers are less likely to take the potentially profitable risks
diversified shareholders would want them to take because the managers stand to
lose more than the shareholders would if the risk is not ultimately profitable.41 A
diversified shareholder’s portfolio is designed to absorb the losses associated with
unsuccessful risks.42 As Professor Henry Hu points out, well-diversified
shareholders have different risk and time preferences than poorly diversified
shareholders, as well as different preferences than management may have or think
the shareholders have.43 He argues that, despite public perceptions to the contrary,
shareholders want corporations to engage in investment activity that entails a high
degree of total risk, as long as that risk is “diversifiable” by the shareholder in
designing his portfolio.44
Incentive compensation tools such as options encourage risk taking by
allowing managers to enjoy the fruits of a successful strategy without being
directly penalized if the investment fails.45 These options may even make
managers “too” risk-seeking when the corporation is healthy.46 While the promises
of great wealth that accompany stock options and other aggressive forms of
incentive compensation may make managers more risk-preferring, officers remain
consistently more risk-averse than the well-diversified shareholder.47
personal costs and the anxieties that go with them also represent a source
of on the job utility . . . .
Id. at 313.
41.
See Hu, supra note 20, at 320. This article states that:
Specifically, a diversified shareholder would not want the managers of a
publicly held corporation to act in a way intended to ensure the wellbeing of the corporation. If managers were to focus on the total risk of an
investment project instead of the nondiversifiable risk, for instance, they
might enhance the health of the firm, but they would probably not
maximize the share price. Shareholders, regardless of their individual
risk preferences, generally would want managers instead to focus
primarily on nondiversifiable risk in evaluating corporate investment
opportunities.
Id. at 299–300.
42.
Michael Abramowicz, Speeding up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG.
139, 145 (2003); see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 259.
43.
Hu, supra note 20, at 287–94.
44.
Id.
45.
Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1901, 1930–31 (2001).
46.
Hu, supra note 20, at 319, 327–29; Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood
Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory
Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1492–95 (1993).
47.
See Hu, supra note 20, at 318–19 (explaining that despite the promise of
stock options to managers they “may be much less well diversified than shareholders as a
result of the large amounts of ‘human capital’ . . . invested in their corporations . . .
caus[ing] managers to be overly sensitive to risk.”); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 21, at
352. Jensen and Meckling explain that where a manager has fractional ownership of a
corporation his incentives will not exactly mirror that of the corporation, but:
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Management’s natural risk aversion is heightened considerably by the loan
agreements they enter on behalf of the corporation and the power over corporate
management that significant creditors can exercise as a result.48
One of the basic justifications of the business judgment rule, which is
designed to protect directors from personal liability for failed good faith business
decisions, is that corporate risk taking is beneficial to shareholders, and imposing
personal liability on managers when the business decisions fail would serve only to
discourage often profitable corporate risks. A well-diversified shareholder does not
care if one corporation takes a risk that fails; she may not even care if one
corporation becomes insolvent.49 It is axiomatic of corporate investment that big
returns accompany big risks.50 Rational, well-diversified shareholders want
corporate managers to take significant, though well-calculated and intelligent, risks
in designing the corporation’s investment strategy. However, shareholder influence
over managerial decision making has always been limited.
B. Mechanisms of Shareholder Influence
While directors are technically in charge51 of the corporation’s
management under Delaware corporate law,52 the real decision makers of the

forces exist to determine an equilibrium distribution of outside
ownership. If the costs of reducing the dispersion of ownership are lower
than the benefits to be obtained from reducing the agency costs, it will
pay some individual or group of individuals to buy shares in the market
to reduce the dispersion of ownership.
Id.
48.
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, 1217–18.
49.
Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343,
345 (1997). Adler argues:
[A] combination of preferred equity and debt allows dispersed investors
to enjoy the advantages of fixed obligations without fear of liquidation
while a firm is likely to be viable, and permits these investors to benefit
from liquidation through creditor competition for assets when the firm is
likely to be inviable. Bankruptcy law interferes with this design by
protecting even those firms that should not continue . . . . The occasional
successful rescue of a viable firm may not justify this ubiquitous cost.
Id.
50.
See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate
Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 549–50 (1983) (illustrating a hypothetical situation
in which the higher payout to the corporation and dividends to shareholders includes the
most risk and vice versa).
51.
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors . . . .”).
52.
Corporations flock to Delaware to incorporate due to the specialized
corporate court system, extensive and widely known case law, and friendly statutory law
including protection for directors from personal liability relating to duty of care violations.
For this reason, Delaware law is the most relevant in considering the law governing large,
public corporations. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 725–30 (2002).
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corporation are the CEO and the rest of the senior management team.53 The
directors of large, public corporations serve on several boards and usually hold
demanding day jobs.54 Each directorship is but a part-time job. The board of
directors votes on major corporate decisions, and in doing so, often defers to the
recommendations and judgments of the senior management team. The day-to-day
decisions and the specific details of the major decisions for the firm are made and
devised by the senior officers.55 These officers are not seriously constrained by
fiduciary duties to the corporation or its shareholders.56
Shareholder powers are more directly designed to constrain the board of
directors. Shareholders can elect board members, initiate proxy contests to replace
the current board, and combine their votes in ways that may achieve some of their
objectives.57 The directors the shareholders elect choose the company’s officers, so
shareholders only indirectly affect who serves as a corporate manager.58
Shareholders can excite public outrage or at least bring public attention to bad
management in an effort to force the board’s hand or, in extreme circumstances, to
lobby for legislation that may affect corporate decision making.59 Shareholders
attempt to align managerial incentives and minimize agency costs through
incentive compensation packages and employment terms.60 These terms are
negotiated on the shareholders’ behalf by the board of directors. Employment
terms aim to align senior officers’ incentives with the goals of shareholders and
measure success largely in terms of increased stock price.61 Managers are
53.
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes–Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric,
Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 954–56 (2003) (explaining
that with the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley in 2002 federal law holds accountable the officers
of the corporations, as they are the ones who really exercise control over corporate decision
making).
54.
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 231.
55.
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 155–56 (9th ed. 2005) (“Under modern corporate
practice in publicly held corporations, the management function is ordinarily located not in
the board, but in the executives . . . .”). There are many constraints on the board including
time, information, composition, and monitoring that make it very difficult for the board of
directors to control the day-to-day activities of the corporation and thus the burden of
management shifts to the officers and managers. Id.
56.
Thompson & Sale, supra note 16, at 906 (explaining that managers of
corporations technically have fiduciary duties that can be enforced by shareholders, but the
gap in Delaware’s jurisdictional statutes prevents many lawsuits from being brought in
Delaware for managers’ breach of fiduciary duty). The problem with the current statute is
that it does not allow for personal jurisdiction for managers who have allegedly breached
their fiduciary duties, rather the statute only extends to the directors of the corporation. Id.
57.
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 439–41.
58.
Id.
59.
Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax
Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 880 (2007).
60.
Henderson, supra note 24, at 1549–50.
61.
Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1358 (“A second, more modern
conception equates shareholder welfare with the trading price of shares. According to this
view, shareholder wealth maximization is sought directly rather than as a byproduct of
corporate welfare.”).
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compensated with equity in the firm and given stock options that allow them to
capitalize on large increases in a corporation’s stock price over time.62 Senior
officers may also be compensated with bonuses awarded upon certain increases in
stock price or earnings or the achievement of other specific goals.63 Shareholders
can directly affect the value of these grants by exiting the firm if they believe it is
being managed poorly.64 A mass exodus would cause the stock price to decline and
so make officers’ stock options worthless. Managers are also motivated to
maintain their professional reputations.65
Compensation incentives and the agency cost problem have been
thoroughly studied,66 and corporations have adopted governance mechanisms that
realize the best results for the firm and its shareholders when the corporation
thrives. However, shareholders neither have immediate incentives to pay much
attention to what is happening within a corporation that is insolvent, nor do they or
their attorneys have strong incentives to enforce the fiduciary duties they are
owed.67 If a troubled company’s shareholders are unhappy with its deterioration,
they will simply sell their shares.68 Enhanced shareholder apathy only increases the
managerial tendency to be risk-averse and submit to the will of strong creditor
influence. At some point, the cost of the possibility of losing a position as a senior
officer at the behest of angry creditors outweighs any potential benefit that
62.
Henderson, supra note 24, at 1549.
63.
Id. at 1599.
64.
See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 462 (1990) (noting “[t]he traditional Wall Street
rule—sell out if you dislike management . . . .”).
65.
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 39, at 921 (exploring the unfortunate
situation of the former CEO Al Dunlap who followed the theory of running the corporation
for the sole benefit of the shareholder and was overwhelmingly successful at Scott Paper but
was unable to achieve the same success at Sunbeam, where the company had to eventually
file bankruptcy and he was shown the door).
66.
See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 21, at 305–06; Kevin J. Murphy,
Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 715, 739 (1995).
Murphy analyzes the problem of executive compensation and ties it to corporate welfare.
Compensation strategies need lower base salaries with high potential payoffs. Murphy
predicted firms which utilize a formulaic accounting based bonus system will encourage
officers to maximize short term profits while firms that utilize incentives such as stock
options are increasing the incentives for officers to engage in long-term growth of the
corporation.
67.
The failure of shareholders and their attorneys to enforce the fiduciary duties
owed to them in the insolvency context can also be analyzed through the bankruptcy
context. See David A. Skeel Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994). Skeel writes:
Because [shareholders] have little financial interest in an insolvent firm,
and because most or all of any recovery would go to higher priority
claimants, shareholders lose much of their incentive to promote and
participate in derivative litigation. To the extent shareholders do play at
least a minor role in a given suit, they are therefore likely to be
indifferent (and perhaps even resistant) in the bankruptcy context.
Id. at 500–01.
68.
Henderson, supra note 24, at 1558.
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managers could realize by acting with their incentive compensation in mind and
trying to take risks that will drive up the price of the company’s stock.69 Creditors
have a particular advantage over shareholders in influencing management when
the corporation is within the zone of insolvency. In fact, greater access to corporate
financial information and a greater ability to use that information may give
creditors an advantage as soon as strict loan terms are agreed upon by the
corporation.
C. Information—The Gateway to the Exercise of Influence
Disclosure requirements ensure that the market knows more or less what
a corporation is doing, how it is capitalized, and whether it is headed toward
financial difficulty.70 The market for information also helps to keep investors and
the market as a whole apprised of corporations whose managers take irrational
risks.71 If a shareholder is unhappy with the level of risk a particular company is
engaging in, she can sell her stock and invest elsewhere. Unfortunately, the
riskiness of the investments the corporation is making is not always readily
available to shareholders.72 Shareholders do not always know when management
may be making significant investment decisions or how they are resolving
questions that present certain probabilities of success.73 Although it would be very
inefficient for managers to be forced to disclose this information ex ante, the
decision itself and its outcome will become well known ex post. For these reasons,
shareholders are not always in a position to take action that will influence
managerial decision making ex ante. When they do have sufficient information,
shareholders have various tools at their disposal to try to influence the direction the
corporation will take but may not be able to move as swiftly as creditors can in
response to upcoming managerial decisions.74
In addition to a more direct path to corporate managers and a unified and
sophisticated representative, creditors have a significant advantage when it comes
to corporate information. This is particularly true for private creditors when the
corporation is in poor financial condition.75 Creditors can build broad definitions
of situations in which risky decisions may be made into their loan covenants and
so receive special notice of such situations. This gives an informational advantage
over and above the one creditors already have in their ability to evaluate, process,

69.
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669,
748 (1992).
70.
See generally Hu, supra note 20, at 367–68.
71.
Id. at 378–79.
72.
See id. at 376–77.
73.
See id. at 378–79; see infra fig.1, at 1080.
74.
See supra Part I.A.
75.
See, e.g., Delphi Corp., $2,825,000,000 Five-Year Third Amended and
Restated Credit Agreement (Form 8-K), at § 6.1 (June 15, 2005), available at
http://www.secinfo.com/dsvR3.z3nr.d.htm#1stPage [hereinafter Delphi Corp. Loan
Agreement]; Gen. Motors Corp., 364-Day Revolving Credit Agreement (Form 10-Q), at
§ 2.17 (Aug. 7, 2007), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dsvR3.u3t4.8.htm#1stPage
[hereinafter General Motors Loan Agreement].
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and act on regular notices about the corporation’s financial well-being. The
greatest advantage creditors have is in their unified representation and their ability
to have one sophisticated party review corporate information and act on their
behalf. The widely dispersed, rationally apathetic shareholders are comparatively
disadvantaged in their inability to act and negotiate as a cohesive unit. In order to
achieve balance between shareholder and creditor influences, shareholders should
take a cue from creditor access to information and their ability to swiftly and
meaningfully respond to it. Collectively, shareholders may be able to make
investment decisions that will affect the firm’s stock price and the managers’
incentive compensation, but that power pales in comparison to the creditors’
ability to replace a senior officer when something is amiss.
Shareholders have only very limited and indirect means to monitor and
influence senior officers. While incentive compensation may work well to align
managerial incentives with the interests of shareholders when a corporation is
solvent, shareholder influence breaks down as insolvency nears. Further, the
greater access to information and more sophisticated, unified representation
creditors can boast gives them a significant advantage over shareholders when the
corporation is experiencing financial difficulty.
This Part has explored what the shareholders’ interests are in a
corporation, what risk preference they would like the corporation to have, and how
they exert influence on corporate managers. It has also noted that shareholder
access to timely corporate information and their ability to act on it collectively is
limited and far surpassed by the means creditors have to act intelligently and in
concert. Part II of this Article will examine creditor preferences and the tools
creditors, particularly large institutional creditors, can use to influence corporate
decision making. It will demonstrate how that creditor power exceeds that
exercised by shareholders in times of financial difficulty.

II. CREDITOR PREFERENCES AND INFLUENCE
Despite all of the attention paid to aligning management interests with
those of shareholders, managers, particularly those of financially struggling
companies, often feel strong pressures to make business decisions for the
corporation that will please its creditors.76 Creditors have no legal right to force
their judgments upon managers. The loan agreements they enter are with the
debtor—the corporation—not its management team. Nevertheless, creditors are
able to exert pressure on senior officers by threatening to declare a default on
corporate loans, which would send the firm into even more perilous financial
waters.77 Large institutional lenders can remove managers or install new ones by
threatening to exercise their rights against the corporation under the loan
agreement.78 Through the extensive rights many credit agreements grant bank
76.
See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1219.
77.
Id. at 1217.
78.
Id. at 1244–45 (explaining that creditor control is likely to arise where the
possibility of loan distress looms over the corporation, and replacing the managers through
creditor control is the optimal choice for the worried creditors, but not necessarily the best
option for the corporation).
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lenders, creditors can exert more direct control over management and the direction
of the corporation than any other constituent group, even when the corporation is
solvent. The ability to dictate favorable loan terms and capitalize on the
advantages afforded them under fraudulent transfer and bankruptcy law
notwithstanding, creditors have still tried to define their relationship with the
management of a troubled company as a fiduciary one.79
This Part will first explain why creditors ultimately cannot rely on
fiduciary duties to assure management compliance with their decision making
preferences and why the debate about fiduciary duties owed to creditors does not
solve the problem this Article addresses. Next it will discuss the powers creditors
can exercise in bankruptcy. Finally, it will show how some creditors are able to
reserve powers for themselves before bankruptcy that anticipate the control they
will share with other creditors should the firm file Chapter 11.
A. Fiduciary Duties
In recent years, creditors have tried unsuccessfully to establish the
existence of a fiduciary duty owed directly to them when a corporation is insolvent
or within the “zone of insolvency.”80 Creditors have supported their argument in
favor of fiduciary duties by reasoning that upon a corporation’s insolvency, the
creditors replace the shareholders as the residual claimants, so they should be the
beneficiaries of the same fiduciary duties to the corporation that the shareholders
benefitted from when the corporation was solvent.81 The goal is to justify and even
legally force business decisions that creditors would prefer: relatively cautious,
conservative risk-avoiding actions.82 Attempts to punish managers for erroneous
79.
See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. Inc. v. Gheewalla,
930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007); Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del.
Ch. 2004); Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386 (Del. Ch. 1999); Geyer v.
Ingersoll Publ’n Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).
80.
In North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation v.
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007), the court reestablished the proposition that a
creditor could never bring a direct suit for breach of fiduciary duties against the directors of
a solvent corporation in the “zone of insolvency.” The court noted that other rights available
to creditors include “protection through contractual agreements, fraud and fraudulent

conveyance law, implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, bankruptcy law,
general commercial law and other sources of creditor rights.” Id. at 99. In Production
Resources Group L.L.C. v. NCT Group Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 794 (Del. Ch. 2007), the
court concluded that if a corporation were insolvent, creditors could sue derivatively
for breach of fiduciary duties, but, in dicta, acknowledged that although unlikely, the
possibility of a direct suit for breach of fiduciary duty to creditors may exist. The
Gheewalla court later clarified the Production Resources holding by explaining that
direct suits by creditors against the directors of an insolvent corporation for breach of
fiduciary duty should not be allowed as such an action would create uncertainty for the
directors in exercising their business judgment, and create conflicts between their duty
to maximize the value of the corporation and the rights of creditors. Gheewalla, 930
A.2d at 103.
81.
See, e.g., Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 92; Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 772;
Odyssey, 735 A.2d at 386; Geyer, 621 A.2d at 784.
82.
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 81.

2008]

STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE

1069

but good faith, disinterested decisions have been unsuccessful.83 The business
judgment rule protects the decision about which party’s interests to favor as long
as the directors choose the course of action they honestly and rationally believe is
in the best interests of the corporation.84 Delaware courts have refused to recognize
a direct cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty to creditors.85 Further, in
Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court held that creditors may only derivatively
enforce the fiduciary duties directors owe the corporation and may only do so
when the corporation is insolvent.86 Various scholars have weighed in on the
question of fiduciary duties to creditors in the zone of insolvency.87 Though the
academic debate was long and thorough, the question may have been finally
resolved by the court in Gheewalla.
In any event, imposition of fiduciary duties is not the answer to the
conflict between creditor and shareholder interests this Article seeks to resolve.
First, as mentioned above, fiduciary duties are most useful in constraining the selfinterested behavior of directors. They are not helpful in devising ways to align the
incentives of senior officers. Further, the managerial decisions considered here
would not constitute breaches of fiduciary duty regardless of whether shareholder
interests or creditor interests are preferred. The goal is to align managerial
incentives so that senior officers make the business decision that results in the
greatest wealth maximization for the corporation. The question is how to give
managers the incentives to make the best decision for the corporation when there is
no threat that any sort of fiduciary duty would be breached but the manager
nonetheless faces other pressures from shareholders and creditors urging their
competing interests.
Losing the fiduciary duty battle does not leave creditors without
significant protections or means of influencing managers to honor their preferences
in corporate decision making. Creditors are able to negotiate directly with the
corporation and use very specific loan documents that often list detailed
requirements about how the corporation should be run and what management can
and cannot do without creditor approval.88 Creditors are also protected by
fraudulent conveyance laws89 and, of course, by the rights they acquire when a
corporation is in bankruptcy.

83.
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 81.
84.
See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ.
A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (illustrating the
difficult business decisions faced by managers and the importance of protecting the
reasonable and good faith decisions of managers through the business judgment rule).
85.
Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 776 (holding that creditors of an insolvent
corporation or a corporation operating in the zone of insolvency could not bring a direct
action for breach of fiduciary duty against the directors).
86.
Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 103.
87.
Id. at 99 n.28.
88.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1217.
89.
WILLIAM H. NORTON JR., 3 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2D § 74:5 (2007);
Steve H. Nickles, Behavioral Effect of New Bankruptcy Law on Management and Lawyers:
Collage of Recent Statutes and Cases Discouraging Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 59 ARK. L.
REV. 329, 348–49 (2006).
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B. Bankruptcy
Creditors are able to enforce the fiduciary duties directors and officers
owe to the corporation once the corporation is insolvent or has entered
bankruptcy.90 While that right simply reflects a shift in the party that has standing
to enforce the duties owed to the corporation rather than a shift in the beneficiary
of the right,91 the standing issue is not irrelevant. Creditors are less likely to bring
an action for breach of fiduciary duty if the decision the managers and directors
make is one that the creditors support.92 While there is no enhanced legal duty to
prefer creditor interests when creditors gain the ability to enforce the fiduciary
duties owed to the corporation, there is certainly a strong disincentive to take
actions creditors would perceive as compromising their positions or failing to
maximize the value of the estate for distribution to them.
The standard justification for giving creditors the ability to enforce the
fiduciary duties owed the corporation and to exercise enhanced control when a
corporation enters bankruptcy is that the creditors become the corporation’s
residual claimants.93 Junior unsecured creditors have replaced equity holders as the
group that will receive whatever is left over after all other claims are satisfied.94
For this reason, junior creditors can often assume some of the protections usually
afforded shareholders, such as bringing derivative actions95 and exercising some
90.
In re Scott Acquisition Corp., 344 B.R. 283, 286 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)
(finding that under Delaware law, directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to creditors
when the corporation is insolvent); In re TEU Holdings Inc., 287 B.R. 26, 32–33 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2002) (finding that creditors can sue directors and officers for breach of fiduciary duty
and in this case the court found that they had breached their duties to the creditors and the
corporation); Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 787; Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d
784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992).
91.
Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 545.
92.
Creditors, for instance, would not have sued the directors for breach of
fiduciary duty after the company entered bankruptcy as a shareholder did in Agostino v.
Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110 (Del. Ch. 2004). In this case plaintiffs, shareholders, sued the
directors directly for breach of fiduciary duty where the company’s restructuring plan called
for the elimination of the plaintiff’s equity interest without compensation, and holders of the
company’s notes, i.e. the creditors, were issued new stock. Id. at 1115. In bankruptcy
meritorious derivative claims can disappear this is called the “black hole effect.” Id. at 1126.
This effect “exacerbates the incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to underinvest in the
individual lawsuits in their portfolio.” Id. (citing Skeel, supra note 67, at 500).
93.
Ribstein & Alces, supra note 7, at 531.
94.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). The statute describes the absolute
priority rule:
The general principle of the subsection permits confirmation
notwithstanding nonacceptance by an impaired class if that class and all
below it in priority are treated according to the absolute priority rule. The
dissenting class must be paid in full before any junior class may share
under the plan. If it is paid in full, then junior classes may share.
Treatment of classes of secured creditors is slightly different because
they do not fall in the priority ladder, but the principle is the same.
Id. § 1129 (Historical and Statutory Notes).
95.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 131 cmt. g
(2000) (“When an organization such as a business corporation is sued in a derivative action,
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control over who will manage the firm.96 Creditor control can be particularly
effective in bankruptcy because the creditors are the main party in interest. They
are the group paying the most attention to the debtor’s estate and business
decisions and the most likely to object to decisions or petition the court to cause
the debtor to pursue a particular cause of action.97
The committee of unsecured creditors (the “creditors’ committee”)
appointed by the U.S. Trustee’s office consists of the debtor’s largest creditors and
can wield considerable power over a company’s reorganization.98 The creditors’
committee has statutory power to look over the debtor’s shoulder for the duration
of the reorganization process.99 It is a direct supervisor of the debtor in possession
(DIP) and is specifically empowered to move for the appointment of a trustee if the
debtor’s management abuses its authority or take actions that harm the debtor.100
Because a majority of the creditors who will not be paid in full must vote to
confirm a plan of reorganization and the creditors’ committee is supposed to
represent the interests of all unsecured creditors, a plan of reorganization is
generally not confirmed without the support of the creditors’ committee.101 The
creditors’ committee, as a party in interest, has standing to request that the DIP or
trustee bring an avoidance action against a particular creditor and, if the DIP
refuses, to bring the suit itself with court permission.102 The ability to act on the
DIP’s behalf makes the creditors’ committee a force within the debtor’s
reorganization. In bankruptcy, creditors can therefore exercise even more power
over the corporation than its shareholders could outside of bankruptcy. Once the
corporation is insolvent and files for bankruptcy, management practically serves at
the pleasure of the debtor’s major creditors.103 For all of the formal power placed
in the creditors’ committee, one creditor or group of creditors can exert more
practical control over the debtor, and particularly the debtor’s management, than
the organization is ordinarily aligned as an involuntary plaintiff. Persons associated with the
organization who are accused of breaching a duty to the organization, typically officers and
directors of the organization, are ordinarily named as defendants. The theory of a derivative
action is that relief is sought from the individuals for the benefit of the organization.”);
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 29, at 362 (“[A] ‘derivative’ suit is one brought by the shareholders
on behalf of the corporation. The cause of action belongs to the corporation as an entity . . . .
The shareholder is merely acting as the firm’s representative.”).
96.
Henderson, supra note 24, at 1569 (citing Skeel, supra note 24, at 922).
97.
Creditors can petition the court to ask the DIP or trustee to bring certain
cause of action on behalf of the estate. Kelli A. Alces, Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary
Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 83, 138–39 (2007).
98.
11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (2006).
99.
The creditors’ committee may “investigate the acts, conduct, assets,
liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business and
the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other matter relevant to the
case or to the formulation of a plan.” Id. § 1103(c)(2).
100.
Id. § 1103(c)(4); In re Ionosphere Clubs Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 166 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Eastern Airlines
established the need for the appointment of a trustee by clear and convincing evidence).
101.
CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 807 (1997).
102.
Ex rel. Cybergenics, 330 F.3d 548, 564 (3d Cir. 2003); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET
AL., BANKRUPTCY §§ 2–5(c), 10–13 (1992).
103.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1236–37.
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any others. That is the creditor or group of creditors providing the financing that
the reorganizing corporation needs in order to operate while in bankruptcy.
In recent years, much has been made of the strict terms creditors insist
upon, and are granted, when providing DIP financing.104 Because it would be
difficult to find someone willing to lend (sometimes hundreds of)105 millions of
dollars to a bankrupt company when a significant portion of those funds will be
used to administer the bankruptcy case rather than to operate and generate profits
for the business, the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) authorizes bankruptcy courts
to allow the debtor to pledge whatever assets and grant whatever priorities are
necessary to induce the post-petition lender to finance the reorganization.106 The
Code gives bankruptcy courts the ability to award the DIP lender an administrative
claim or a claim superior to all other administrative claims, allowing the DIP
lender to be paid in full before any other unsecured lenders.107 The DIP can also be
granted liens in all unencumbered property and may even receive a new lien that is
equal in rights to pre-existing senior liens on debtor property.108 Beyond the formal
grants to DIP lenders in the Code, DIP lenders negotiate for specific contract terms
that give them significant control over the debtor’s management.
David Skeel points to US Airways’ bankruptcy financing as a particularly
poignant example of management monitoring terms DIP lenders often include.109
The DIP lender in that case negotiated for the right to fill five of the twelve seats
on the airline’s board once the company emerged from bankruptcy while only
taking 37.5% of the company’s post-bankruptcy equity.110 The DIP was able to use
creditor power and information to make decisions as a shareholder.111 DIP lenders
also use the terms of the financing agreement to force the DIP management’s hand
in making business decisions.112
The extent of creditor control is important because of the change of
control it effects when the corporation is insolvent or files bankruptcy.
Shareholders enjoy control while the corporation is healthy; creditors take over
upon insolvency. Large institutional lenders have been able to reserve a good deal
104.
Skeel, supra note 24, at 925–26 (“Lenders have responded to the greater
importance of post-petition financing and to creditors' concerns about the Chapter 11
process by using the terms of DIP loans to shape the Chapter 11 case.”).
105.
Id. (giving as an example US Airways’ negotiation to borrow up to $740
million during the course of reorganization).
106.
11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006); Skeel, supra note 24, at 923.
107.
Skeel, supra note 24, at 923.
108.
Id.
109.
Id. at 925–26.
110.
Id. at 926.
111.
Id.
112.
See In re Source Enters., Inc., No. 06-11707(AJG), 2007 WL 2903954, at
*17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2007) (confirming the reorganization plan over the objections
of an unsecured creditor that the DIP relinquished control of the company to the DIP lender
to the detriment of other creditors); In re Trans World Airlines Inc., No. 01-00056(PJW),
2001 WL 1820326, at *9 (Bankr. D. Del. April 2, 2001) (approving the proposed financing
plan over the objections of TWA that the plan included provisions which the corporation
argued ceded to much control to the DIP lender).
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of control when the corporation is in the zone of insolvency.113 They achieve most
of this power during the transition by using particularly onerous loan covenants to
constrain the decision making of corporate managers so that less than perfectly
healthy corporations do not take undue risks with creditor funds.114
C. Loan Covenants
Loan agreements contain covenants, affirmative and negative, about how
the debtor should behave during the loan term. The covenants are freely agreed to
by corporate management, and most are fairly standard in loans of a considerable
size. They often go beyond requiring that the corporation keep the creditor
informed and make specific capitalization demands.115 Loan covenants and the
power they give creditors have the potential not only to change the standard to
which managers are held, but also to result in an effective change in control.116
Covenants give creditors leverage to limit the risk of their investment. The
agreements are set up so that breach of a covenant constitutes an event of default
that accelerates the payment of the loan. A creditor can threaten to declare a
default if a covenant is breached and so may extract certain management decisions
from the debtor with an offer to forego the declaration of default.117 These
covenants, then, define circumstances under which the creditor can exercise
indirect control over management. The covenants themselves limit the decisions
the corporation can make and the significance of risks it can take.118 In many ways,
they allow creditors to have more power than shareholders would be able to claim.
This section will explore each of these issues while looking at typical loan
covenants, as well as those that might be imposed on a riskier loan.
When loaning significant cash to a corporation, either on a revolving
basis or as a straight loan of capital, bank creditors require that they be kept
apprised of the corporation’s financial condition. They typically require annual and
quarterly financial statements,119 as well as the right to inspect the corporation’s
property, books, and records and require immediate notice of default, litigation
against the debtor, or any other event that may have a “material adverse effect” on
the corporation.120 Debtor corporations are also typically prohibited from incurring
additional indebtedness, except for loans specifically permitted by the relevant
113.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1250.
114.
Id. at 1216–17.
115.
See Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders:
Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 355, 367 (1990).
116.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1219.
117.
Id. at 1232.
118.
Gilson, supra note 115, at 367.
119.
See, e.g., Delphi Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 6.1; General
Motors Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 5.01; Visteon Corp., Amended and Restated
Five-Year Revolving Loan Credit Agreement (Form 8-K EX-10.4), § 7.1 (June 30, 2005),
available at http://www.secinfo.com/dsvR3.z4Z9.a htm#1stPage [hereinafter Visteon Corp.
Loan Agreement].
120.
See, e.g., Delphi Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 75, §§ 6.6, 6.7(c);
General Motors Loan Agreement, supra note 75, §§ 3.01, 3.05; Visteon Corp. Loan
Agreement, supra note 119, §§ 7.6–7.7.
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covenant, and from giving additional liens in its present- or after-acquired
property, with specifically named exceptions.121 Through these positive and
negative covenants and others like them, the bank creditors take steps to ensure
that the risk they are taking by loaning money is not unduly increased and that they
remain aware of the quantity and nature of that risk throughout the life of the loan.
Events of default, at minimum, are defined as breaches of the loan covenants and
may result in the acceleration of the loan so that it is immediately due and payable
in full.122
In the agreements that accompany particularly risky loans, not only are
the affirmative and negative covenants more strict, but the events of default are
more numerous. Because of the loan covenants and events of default, creditors
may rely less on the skill or trustworthiness of the corporation’s management. The
banks can simply monitor the corporation’s financial condition and declare a
default if the position or security they have negotiated for themselves is
compromised. Because a declaration of default on one loan can result in a
declaration of default on all loans,123 which will result in the acceleration of all of
the corporation’s obligations at once, the instant any creditor has the right to
declare a default, it has the power to drive the corporation into severe financial
distress, if not insolvency, and can then begin to exert control over the
corporation.124 The loan covenants creditors add when they are making a loan for a
risky proposition, loaning a large amount of money to a company in a precarious
financial position, or restructuring a loan that a corporation needs help honoring,
include stricter constraints on the actions managers can take while the loan is
outstanding and also allow the creditor to declare a default as soon as the stability
the creditor relied upon is threatened.
As an example, consider Visteon Corporation’s loan agreement with five
banks entered in 2005, just after it negotiated a bailout of sorts with its former
parent and largest customer, Ford Motor Company.125 The agreement contains
121.
Delphi Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 7.2; Visteon Corp. Loan
Agreement, supra note 119, § 7A.2.
122.
Covenant language like this can be found in some loans:
[I]n each and every case, with the consent of the required banks, the
administrative agent may, or upon the request of the required banks, the
administrative agent shall, by notice in writing to the Company,
terminate the commitments and/or declare the principal of all loans to the
company and its affiliates and all other amounts owing under the
Agreement . . . to be due and payable immediately, and upon any such
declaration the same shall become and shall be immediately due and
payable, without presentment, demand, protest or other notice of any
kind, all of which are hereby expressly waived.
Delphi Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 8; General Motors Loan
Agreement, supra note 75, § 7; Visteon Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 119,
§ 8.1(k).
123.
Another loan covenant that can be found in particularly risky loans requires
that the corporation continue to pay all of its obligations as agreed. Visteon Corp. Loan
Agreement, supra note 119, § 7.3; Delphi Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 6.3.
124.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1211.
125.
Visteon Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 119, pmbl.
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affirmative covenants that require Visteon to pay all of its obligations to other
creditors as agreed,126 to maintain its current lines of business,127 and to give the
bank group a first lien on any after-acquired property,128 among other things. The
negative covenants prohibit management from allowing certain debt ratios to
exceed set quarterly quantities for the remainder of the loan term.129 Other
covenants limit the amounts of other indebtedness Visteon could incur,130 as well
as the amount and kind of liens the company could grant in its presently owned or
after-acquired property.131 Visteon is also prohibited from disposing of its assets
with few, specific exceptions.132 The negative covenants go on to limit the nature
and amount of capital expenditures and investments Visteon can make and to
prohibit the prepayment of loans to other creditors.133 The loan agreement even
requires that Visteon not maintain any bank accounts with banks other than those
that make up the bank group granting the loan. Because the banks can exercise a
right of setoff over any cash they hold in a deposit account for the corporation,
they are secured to the extent that Visteon holds cash in a bank account so long as
that account is held by a member of the bank group.134 All of these loan covenants
carefully and specifically detail what management may and may not do with the
corporation’s assets and how it should manage its investments. They fix the levels
of risk the corporation can assume and the extent of its capitalization in ways
shareholders cannot. Creditors achieve this sort of power over the corporation
through their ability to declare a default on the loan. The events of default can
grow more numerous and specific in a particularly risky loan.
Common events of default include the failure to make principal or interest
payments on the loan, a judgment of a certain size entered against the corporation
that is not quickly vacated, discharged, satisfied, or stayed pending appeal, and the

126.
Id. § 7.3.
127.
Id. § 7.4.
128.
Id. § 7.9(a).
129.
Id. § 7A.1.
130.
Id. § 7A.2 (explaining that the corporation cannot “[c]reate, incur, assume,
become liable in respect of or suffer to exist any [i]ndebtedness, except . . . [what has
already been agreed to]”).
131.
Id. § 7A.3.
132.
See, e.g., id. § 7A.5(a)−(i) (“[T]he [d]isposition of obsolete or worn out
property in the ordinary course of business, the sale of inventory in the ordinary course of
business . . . the sale or issuance of any Subsidiary’s Capital Stock to the [c]ompany or
[s]ubsidiary [g]uarantor . . . .”). This is an example of an exception.
133.
Id. §§ 7A.7−A.9.
134.
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 102, §§ 6-38, 6-39, at 360–64. Equitable setoff is
a creditor’s remedy. Both parties are both a creditor and a debtor to each other. The remedy
is most commonly used by banks. The depositor of the bank is also a borrower. The bank is
then a creditor and a debtor at the same time. The two parties are thus indebted to each other
and “[s]etoff thus allows the bank to apply the borrower’s deposit account to reduce the
borrower’s obligation to the bank.” In bankruptcy proceedings under 11 U.S.C § 553 a
setoff right exercised prior to the bankruptcy case cannot normally be avoided, thus the right
of setoff survives bankruptcy. Furthermore, “a creditor’s right of setoff [is] a form of
collateral or security so that the creditor’s claim against the debtor is treated like a secured
claim.” Id.
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voluntary or involuntary filing of a bankruptcy petition.135 Visteon also defaults on
its loan if a change in control occurs.136 This is a slightly more unusual provision
that gives creditors a level of control over and a voice in matters of corporate
governance about which they are usually powerless. The creditors probably do not
plan to use this provision as a means of actually declaring a default after a change
in control occurs, of course. The provision gives the corporation’s management a
takeover defense in the creditors’ favor. That is, any entity interested in purchasing
control of the debtor must pay off the creditors’ loans in full or negotiate with the
creditors directly about whether and how it can assume the obligations. Such a
provision gives the creditors a seat at the table in any takeover negotiations. Aside
from their use of loan covenants and the power to declare defaults to control the
debtor corporation and its management, institutional creditors routinely prohibit
management from taking actions that would have a “material adverse effect” on
the corporation’s status quo.
A “material adverse effect” is commonly defined as one that affects “the
financial condition of the Borrower and its Subsidiaries taken as a whole or
. . . the validity or enforceability of this Agreement and any of the other Loan
Documents or the rights or remedies of the . . . Lenders under the Loan
Documents.”137 Creditors are able to use the “material adverse effect” principle to
change the standard of management behavior by directly prohibiting managers
from causing the corporation to take any action that would result in a material
adverse effect or change in the debtor’s circumstances. The requirement is often
phrased more as a permissive exception. For instance, Visteon must continue to
engage in its current lines of business, preserve and maintain its corporate
existence, and “take all reasonable action to maintain all rights, privileges and
franchises necessary or desirable in the normal conduct of its business . . . except
. . . to the extent that failure to do so could not reasonably be expected to have a
Material Adverse Effect.”138 This “first, do no harm” admonition appears
throughout the negative covenants in the loan agreement. While at first it may
seem to give managers more discretion within the agreement—managers can
ignore certain requirements and prohibitions if they reasonably expect that doing
135.
Delphi Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 8; General Motors Loan
Agreement, supra note 75, § 7; Visteon Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 119, §§ 8.1−8.2.
136.
Visteon Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 119, § 8.1(k). Despite the default
provisions pertaining to the change of control some firms have given banks “a special class
of equity security that guarantees them control over a minimum number of board seats.”
These provisions can lead to “direct lender representation on the board of directors.” Gilson,
supra note 114, at 365.
137.
General Motors Loan Agreement, supra note 75, § 1; See Gilson, supra note
115, at 362 (explaining that when default occurs there is a transfer of the firm’s assets to the
creditors. Bank lenders have significant control over resource allocation in distressed firms
through two sources: “(i) explicit stock ownership and representation on the board of
directors and (ii) restrictions on corporate financing and investment policy contained in the
firm’s debt covenants.”). Some agreements contain exceptions for the events disclosed in
certain federally mandated filings and shareholder litigation arising there from, but reserve
the right to consider any resulting condition or circumstance when determining whether a
material adverse affect has occurred in the future.
138.
Visteon Corp. Loan Agreement, supra note 119, § 7.4.
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so will not harm the corporation’s financial standing or compromise the creditors’
rights—it significantly lowers the standard for challenging managerial discretion
that would otherwise apply. Under these “material adverse effect” terms, managers
must act on reasonable expectations that are much easier to second guess and
undermine than the business judgment rule’s standard of rationally or honestly
believing a decision to be in the best interests of the corporation.139 Corporate law
has long avoided imposing a reasonableness standard on decisions made by
corporate managers.140 In these loan agreements, the creditors suggest a course of
conduct that they think will insure that the corporation is very likely to be able to
meet its obligations to the creditors. If those suggestions are ignored, then the
course chosen must be one that the managers can reasonably expect not to cause
harm to the corporation’s financial health or continued existence. If the managers
make a decision that does end up harming the corporation, then the creditors will
have a credible reason to challenge it as unreasonable and declare a default for the
breach of a covenant. The “material adverse effect” language is, therefore, yet
another way creditors can directly, though subtly, exercise control over the
decisions corporate managers make on behalf of the firm.
This combination of control mechanisms gives creditors more implicit
power over corporate management, particularly when the corporation is in a bad
financial position, than they could explicitly reserve or exert and more power than
shareholders are legally entitled to exercise. Shareholders may not make business
decisions for a corporation. They may not remove officers, and they can remove
directors only through shareholder elections.141 Shareholders have no expedient
means to hold managers directly accountable for decisions they make that harm the
corporation or compromise the nature of the risk the shareholders are taking with
their investment. The best shareholders can do is rely on a compensation system
that gives managers incentives to increase shareholder value and disincentives to
compromise it. A corporation’s large bank creditors are able to exercise more
oversight than shareholders can, or will be motivated to exercise, when a
corporation is in trouble. They are able to dictate particular decisions management
will make and can quickly and effectively punish management in ways
shareholders never could because of the rights they reserve for themselves in loan
agreements. Furthermore, when these creditors take corporate stock as collateral
for the loans they make, a default on the loan can effect a change in control
without shareholders’ ever voting to approve the change or receiving the payment
of a control premium that usually accompanies corporate takeovers.142 Large,
institutional creditors really are able to exercise a kind of direct control over a
139.
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
140.
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 n.16 (Del. Ch.
1996).
141.
1 JAMES D. COX ET AL., COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING
UNINCORPORATED FORMS OF DOING BUSINESS § 9.12 (2d ed. 2003).
142.
See, e.g., Odyssey Partners v. Fleming Co., No. C.A. 14770, 1998 WL
155543 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 1998); Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040
(Del. Ch. 1997). Theoretically, the shareholders are not left uncompensated. The
corporation realizes a benefit from using its stock as collateral for the loan because it will
pay a lower interest rate for the loan as a consequence of providing corporate control as
collateral.
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corporation’s management when a corporation poses a significant risk of default
that shareholders cannot exercise even when the corporation is healthy. That power
significantly influences managerial discretion and thereby intensifies the risk
aversion that is typical of corporate management. This level of creditor control
threatens to undermine the independent managerial decision making upon which
corporate governance law is built.
Having examined the powers creditors have over management both when
the corporation is solvent and when it is not, this Article will now turn to the effect
the mere prospect of creditor control can have on corporate investment decisions
when the company is still solvent.

III. HOW CREDITOR INFLUENCE BLEEDS INTO SOLVENT TIME
(THE UNRAVELING PROBLEM)
Creditor control in times of default, insolvency, and bankruptcy is
relevant to the pre-insolvency struggle between shareholders and creditors because
the power creditors can wield upon default affects managerial decisions well
before those powers are realized. It is the specter of those consequences that
weighs on management when deciding whether to cause the corporation to take a
particular business risk.143 While the threat of creditor control over the corporation
becomes a more real and immediate concern when the corporation faces financial
difficulty or is at risk of breaching a loan covenant or of defaulting on a major
loan, the specter of creditor control always looms over the decisions a responsible
manager will make on behalf of the company.144 Hu and Westbrook warn that
recognizing a fiduciary duty to creditors before bankruptcy would result in
directors who “avoid the entrepreneurial risk taking crucial to our country’s global
competitiveness.”145 They understate the point. Creditors have already reserved for
themselves the kind of control that will assure risk aversion in managers when a
corporation is less than completely financially stable. The ability to enforce direct
breaches of fiduciary duty would indeed discourage value-maximizing decision
making, but creditor control in the zone of insolvency is a more direct route to the
same result. This Part will show how the creditor power reserved in loan
agreements can affect even the decisions of solvent firms and how management

143.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1225–27. Baird and Rasmussen use
Warnaco Corporation as an example of the amount of control that creditors can have over a
solvent corporation. Warnaco was in the Fortune 1000 but invested unsuccessfully in the
1990s in Calvin Klein Jean Outlets. The company had to borrow to continue to operate and
increased its debt from $500 million to $1.5 billion. The shift in control from the
shareholders to creditors occurred at this time. The CEO was replaced even though the
company remained solvent. Warnaco was no longer able to borrow on an unsecured basis
and could only continue to operate with the permission of the institutional lenders. The
incentives to engage in risky transactions disappeared. “The presence of such an
institutional lender fundamentally alters corporate governance. The lending agreement
contains many affirmative and negative covenants that give the lender de facto control over
every aspect of the business.” Id. at 1227.
144.
Id. at 1227–28.
145.
Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1328.
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loyalties will shift to creditor interests in advance of default or insolvency when
creditor and shareholder preferences are at odds.
To appreciate how creditor power accumulates as the corporation faces a
greater likelihood of financial difficulty, suppose a firm (“Firm”) is a large,
publicly held company and has had some financial difficulties but remains solvent.
Firm owes its Bank Group $250 million on a revolving credit facility. The assets
securing the facility are worth $175 million, including cash collateral, so the Bank
Group is undersecured by $75 million. Firm has two investment options. Option A
is a safe bet. It has a 100% chance of earning a $76 million return. Option B is a
riskier proposition but carries a potential return of $150 million. Management
faces a difficult decision when choosing between the two because it will be in
default if the loan remains undersecured at the end of the next fiscal quarter. As
explained above, a default could be catastrophic because it would cause the
corporation to default on its other credit obligations and Firm would certainly be
insolvent if it were forced to pay all of its obligations in full. The Bank Group is
therefore strongly urging Firm’s management to pursue Option A. It has made
clear that if the management team chooses Option B and the venture fails, then
Bank Group will only refrain from declaring a default if the directors agree to
install senior officers of the Bank Group’s choosing. Senior managers face a
possible job loss if they take the action disfavored by the Bank Group and may
face similar, though less focused and therefore less powerful, unrest from
shareholders if they do not pursue the opportunity to make $150 million with
Option B. What probability of success or failure must Option B present to sway
the managers in one way or another? Modeling the strategic decision, or game, and
finding the indifference point provides an answer.146
The managers act first. They choose either Option A or Option B. If they
choose Option A, the Bank Group will be happy and will not take further action.
The shareholders will then have to decide whether to treat the managers well or
treat them poorly. Because the shareholders can only act through their election of
the board of directors to change management, they are not able to as directly exert
their will over individual managers. Still, shareholder voting and monitoring has
become increasingly relevant in recent years as shareholders have adopted various
methods to form influential blocks.147 Although indirect, shareholder power over
management cannot be dismissed out of hand; poor treatment by shareholders can
exact a cost senior management cannot discount.148 More directly, angry
shareholders can exit the firm, thereby making equity compensation for managers

146.
Special thanks to Professor Jonathan Klick for his help in modeling this
hypothetical. The basic facts of the hypothetical come from the kind of problem considered
by Chancellor Allen in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications
Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) which is
based on the facts in In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987).
147.
See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 820–21 (2006).
148.
See Polsky, supra note 59, at 888–89 n.59 (citing Melvin A. Eisenberg &
Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the Theory of Overreliance, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 1335, 1366 n.36 (2003)).
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significantly less valuable and making the firm more susceptible to takeover.149
Because equity compensation accounts for a large portion of senior officer
compensation these days, the cost of such shareholder “punishment” may be
significant.150 A job the manager originally valued at $3 million, in the event of
mass shareholder exit, might only be worth $1 million. Alternatively, if the senior
managers choose Option B, the success of the investment will determine which
party will respond to their choice as well as what the likely reaction will be. The
probability of Option B’s success is therefore an important determinant of how
strongly managers will be influenced by the consequences of its failure, that is, the
punishment threatened by the Bank Group. Here is a diagram of the game which
includes payoffs to be discussed further below:
Figure 1
Option B

Manager

Option A

Nature

Shareholders
Treat Well

Treat Poorly

PF

PS

(3, .5, 75)
Shareholders
Treat Well

Treat Poorly

(4, 75, 75) (0, 72, 75)

Creditors
Treat Well
(3, 0, -76)

Key:
Payoffs: (Directors, Shareholders, Creditors)
PS: Probability of Success
PF: Probability of Failure

149.
150.

(1, 1, 75)

Henderson, supra note 24, at 1558–61.
Id. at 1548–50, 1553–55.

Treat Poorly
(-2, 0, -74)
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It is true that shareholders would prefer Option A if Option B had a poor
chance of success. But, given the large payoff associated with Option B, Option B
would have to have a chance of failure greater than 98% before its expected value
would be less than the $1 million in equity left over after the creditors are satisfied
under Option A.151 Rational, well-diversified shareholders would be willing to see
the corporation take a significant risk in order to try to obtain the $150 million
payoff possible under Option B, so they will have an incentive to punish
management for not taking the risk if the likelihood of failure is somewhat less
than 98%. Of course, a risk preference that extreme does not comport with the
objective of corporate wealth maximization either. Balance between shareholder
and creditor interests should be the goal.
Now consider the expected outcomes given the result of Option B. If
Option B is successful, again, the creditors will not take any action, but this time
the shareholders will be very pleased. The manager will keep his job, which, for
the sake of comparing payoffs, I am valuing at $3 million, and receive a bonus of
$1 million as a reward for the increase in the value of the company due to his
savvy investing on its behalf. Because the shareholders realize a benefit in
enhanced corporate value and thus enhanced stock price, they benefit from treating
the manager who has enhanced the value of their investment well. If Option B
fails, the company will most likely be pushed into insolvency by a declaration of
default or will have to adopt whatever changes the Bank Group insists upon to
avoid such a declaration. In that case, the creditors act. They are now
undersecured, and therefore have lost the $75 million collateral that would have
been available had the company chosen Option A. If they decide to treat
management well, they will not only lose the collateral they counted on, but they
will be the creditors of a company with management that is willing to take
imprudent risks with their money. This effectively makes the loan more expensive
and so the creditors suffer a loss if they fail to take any action against the
managers. Under these circumstances, the creditors will act to install managers that
will be more careful with loan proceeds and better protect the creditors’ position
within the firm. The manager who has decided not to honor creditor preferences
will not only be replaced, but his reputation on the job market will be diminished
and he will have to waste six months of his career assisting the turnaround
specialist the creditors will have the right to appoint before he can move on to his
next position. This accounts for the additional $2 million “cost” of punishment to
the manager.
What decision should Firm’s management make? To which preferences
will they be more sympathetic? The answers to those questions depend on the
likelihood of Option B’s failure. Likelihood of failure equals likelihood of default
here, because if Option B fails, the creditors will be able to declare a default. By
considering this simple example, we can see how likely default has to be in a given
situation for managers to begin to weigh more heavily creditor preferences and
concerns over the investment ambitions of shareholders. This is done by finding
151.
Shareholders would realize $75 million in value after the creditors are paid
under Option B. The expected value of Option B with a probability of success of 2% is $1.5
million. ($75 million)(.02)=$1.5 million.
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the indifference point, the point at which a manager is indifferent between Option
A and Option B given his own payoffs. By setting the payoffs on each side equal
to each other and solving for the probability of losing with Option B, we find that
the manager is indifferent as between the two courses of action when it is 50%
likely that Option B will fail.152 Stated more generally, when there is greater than a
50% chance that Firm will default on its loans from the Bank Group, the managers
will weight the Bank Group’s preferences more heavily. We now have decidedly
risk-averse managers.
This indifference point can be manipulated upward by increasing the
payoff for managers for a successful Option B, or by strengthening the penalty
shareholders can or will impose if Option A is chosen. It can be manipulated
downward by creditors if they are able to impose a greater reputation cost on
managers for being removed at the behest of concerned creditors.153 Some
managers may consider the loss of their job at the hands of displeased creditors to
be a greater cost or punishment than the $5 million supposed in the diagram above.
A manager for whom that circumstance would mean a loss of $6 million would
take the course of action preferred by creditors when the chance of default was
only 43%.154 Managers may make the mistake of assigning too great a value to this
result and so may be more risk averse than even their own personal circumstances
require. Fiduciary duties doctrine would prevent managers from taking bonus
payments or rewards from creditors, and creditors cannot contract directly with
managers for loyalty or decisions made in their favor. While their methods of
affecting managers are indirect (as are shareholders’, for that matter), they are not
ineffective.
Shareholders can also adjust rewards to managers for favorable decisions
and the severity of the punishments they impose. An equity trustee, described in
more detail in Part V, infra, can help make shareholder punishment of managers
more likely and less expensive to accomplish. In the example considered in this
section, the shareholders exited the firm and punished the managers through a
decline in the valuation of incentive compensation. This is a much easier and more
efficient alternative to removing managers by lobbying or threatening the board. If
Firm had had an equity trustee serving as a shareholder representative, that equity
trustee’s duties would have begun with the negotiation of the loan from the Bank
Group. An equity trustee privy to all information the creditors would have had
could have informed the shareholders of the upcoming choice and may have made
it easier for the shareholders to register their preferences with the board. More
importantly, a shareholder representative such as an equity trustee could have led
152.

The algebra follows:
1 = 4(1-PF)-2PF
1 = 4-4PF-2PF
-3 = -6PF
1/2 = PF
153.
This is the greatest cost managers face when removed or replaced in their
position or authority by displeased creditors. The cost can be considerable. Baird &
Rasmussen, supra note 39, at 935, 938–39.
154.
-3 = -7PF
3/7 = PF
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to negotiation of less onerous loan covenants. The equity trustee still would not
make any decisions for management, and the actual powers to which shareholders
are legally entitled would not change. Rather, the equity trustee would increase the
power of the shareholders relative to the power of creditors, so that the balance
would not tip so far in the creditors’ favor when the corporation is in a difficult
financial position. If the creditors retained the ability more credibly to threaten a
more severe punishment for managers, then the indifference point would move to a
relatively lower probability of default and so keep managers more risk-preferring
for more of the corporation’s solvent time.
Larger creditors that have loaned significant amounts of cash to a
business have incentives to invest more time and resources in remaining well
informed about the business’s financial condition. They are also able to exercise
more influence, if not outright control, over the business decisions the corporation
makes because of the terms they insist upon in loan agreements.155 Creditors have
no incentives to take risks that jeopardize their goal to be repaid in full with
interest because they do not receive any upside from the business’ success.
Shareholders, on the other hand, care only about the prospect of returns above and
beyond what creditors are owed, and if those risky investments fail, they are no
worse off than they would have been if the corporation only had enough to repay
its creditors.156 Shareholder and creditor risk preferences are therefore very
different, and the results of those differences can make some decisions difficult for
management. Too much pressure from either side may push managers to make
decisions that are not value-maximizing. Part IV will demonstrate how dominance
by either shareholder or creditor preferences will not necessarily lead to corporate
wealth maximization. Instead, balanced influence and managerial independence is
essential.

IV. THE STRUGGLE—DIFFICULT DECISIONS FOR MANAGEMENT,
FINDING THE OPTIMAL PATH
The constant struggle between shareholder and creditor interests and
preferences is magnified when a corporation is in a perilous financial position
where resources may be scarce. Sometimes shareholder preferences dominate and
sometimes they go too far, particularly when control is concentrated in a few
dominant owners.157 Other times, creditor risk aversion is the primary influence on
management. There is often a noticeable lack of balance in one direction or the
other, and that imbalance will not necessarily lead to the decision most likely to
maximize corporate wealth. Shareholders often lack the detailed monitoring
abilities creditors can reserve for themselves and therefore may not fully
appreciate a corporation’s financial position and the choices management faces.158
Creditor power, when reserved and exercised, is not necessarily reviewed or
constrained, and shareholders might not even try to prevent it at the time it is
155.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1211–17.
156.
This point is made clearly and famously by Chancellor Allen. Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
157.
See id.
158.
Henderson, supra note 24, at 1558–61, 1565–66.
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granted. As the struggle over limited resources intensifies, managers face difficult
choices, not only about which group’s interests to prefer, but also about what
choice is best for the corporate enterprise. The decision that may have the greatest
hope of wealth maximization for the corporation may not necessarily be one the
creditors or shareholders would choose if they had the choice.
Agency costs may generally be lower for a financially distressed
company than a healthy one because of the enhanced supervision provided by
creditors and vulture investors.159 Indeed, agency costs may be lower due to a
lessened concern that managers could loot the company at this sensitive time. Still,
the agency cost caused by the struggle between shareholder and creditor interests
in the zone of insolvency is that managers will lose sight of the goal of wealth
maximization in favor of extreme risk aversion that will allow them to enjoy other
personal benefits such as the ability to retain their position with the company and
preserve their professional reputations. They might not steal or engage in selfdealing, but that does not guarantee that they will make the best decisions for the
firm.
First, this Part will evaluate the decision to enter into a loan with strict
covenants or numerous possible events of default. Shareholder interests are cast
aside during the negotiation of such loans when planning for the possibility of
financial distress, and such negotiations would serve as an important trigger for the
use of an equity trustee to insure that a shareholder voice remains if the company
endures financial distress under the terms of the loan. Next, I will turn to the role
of market forces in evaluating this problem and argue that the fact that the market
has not responded to this problem does not mean that it does not exist. Finally, I
will model an investment decision to show why a balance of shareholder and
creditor interests, and absolute dominance by neither, is the best way to ensure that
managers have the independence to make the best business decision for the firm.
A. Loan Terms—Business Judgment and Business Risk
Entering into the loan agreements that give bank creditors significant
power over the corporation through loan covenants and default terms is a business
decision, and a business risk in and of itself. This Article has focused so far on the
behavior and decision making of managers after a risky loan has been undertaken,
as those managers struggle with the resulting balance of power among the
corporate constituents when deciding how to operate a troubled company. Before
we can determine with certainty whether the position in which managers find
themselves after agreeing to various loan covenants is a bad one for shareholders
or the corporation, we must first examine the decision to enter into a particular
loan agreement in the first place. When the money is borrowed, the managers may
be making a choice to expand the corporation, even if it is experiencing financial
difficulty, rather than making the more risk-averse decision to try to cut costs
while carefully continuing to operate the current business.160 At first glance, it may
seem that this system has achieved an optimal balance. After all, if the managers
try to take corporate risks and those risks are unsuccessful, the corporation, its
159.
160.

Id. at 1544.
See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 69, at 748–49.
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shareholders, and management have had their chance and lost, and now the
creditors should be able to do whatever they must to recover the loan made to the
company. Some version of this “balance” may be appropriate, but, upon closer
examination, it becomes clear that the current practice does not necessarily lead to
corporate wealth maximization.
Corporate law and practice usually welcome outcomes that result from
informed bargaining. In the circumstances considered above, the corporation was
in financial trouble and the managers decided to borrow cash to take a business
risk anyway. If the risky investment were unsuccessful, the corporation would
become insolvent. At the time of the loan, neither the managers nor the
shareholders wanted the creditor powers to ripen. Both groups remained hopeful
that the investment would produce a substantial return and crisis would be averted.
Nevertheless, all of the relevant parties knew creditor control was a realistic
possibility under the loan agreement and accepted it as an additional cost of the
loan, in lieu of a higher interest rate, and an additional cost of failure. Indeed, if we
put loan terms to a shareholder vote, the loan agreement might be approved. Such
covenants are the price corporations pay to have the funds with which to take
investment risks. Managers and shareholders alike assume that the current
shareholders will exit if the investment fails and creditor control becomes a
reality.161 Both groups lack incentives to provide for shareholder rights and
preferences upon financial failure because both assume that the current
shareholders will be gone. The circumstances of financial distress and creditor
control, rather than insolvency or bankruptcy, may be the endgame for which
shareholders and their managerial “agents” should plan.
B. Market Forces
There is certainly a valid argument that the market can and would work to
limit creditor power in times of financial distress if it were really a problem.
Significant loan agreements are attached as exhibits to the public disclosures of
large, publicly traded companies. Shareholders in these companies are thereby
informed of the terms under which the corporation has borrowed and are free to
exercise their market power to show their disapproval of credit terms by selling
their stock. If such loan covenants really are harmful to shareholder or corporate
profits, the market will value shares in victim companies less, and managers and
creditors alike will stop favoring such terms. If they thought they needed to,
corporations would plan ahead for troubled times and consider how managers
should make decisions when the corporation nears insolvency. Shareholders,
through the corporation, could then find ways to push managers to act in a certain
way when the corporation is in trouble through the compensation packages and
employment terms offered the managers. Instead, strict loan covenants prevail and
serve as the only real guidelines for corporate decision making in the zone of
insolvency.
Strict loan covenants may confer advantages on both the corporation and
its shareholders. First, they reduce the cost of credit needed to continue the
business or undertake a potentially risky investment. Second, everyone can benefit
161.

Henderson, supra note 24, at 1558.
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from, or free ride on, the additional supervision of management that the creditors
provide.162 Finally, corporations may have to accept these terms in order to take
the risks shareholders would want them to take. Alternatives the creditors may
prefer, such as not making a particular investment at a particular time, or passing
on an investment opportunity with a certain risk of loss, or using available cash to
pay off debts rather than make further corporate investments, may be rejected in
favor of a more aggressive approach if the creditors are assured they will be able to
recoup their investment in the event the corporation falls to a particular level of
financial distress. In a hypothetical shareholder vote, shareholders may willingly
agree to seemingly onerous credit terms in exchange for an opportunity to make a
potentially lucrative corporate investment. Loan covenants and implicit creditor
control are simply costs of much needed credit; indeed, they are costs of the credit
that enables corporations to make risk-seeking investments. While one might think
this is good news for shareholders, a closer examination reveals otherwise.
Shareholder acquiescence in the negotiation of strict loan covenants
should not be mistaken for a signal that such covenants result in the maximization
of corporate or shareholder profits. Rather, such silence on the part of shareholders
simply reflects the decline of shareholder powers and value in the zone of
insolvency; as a result, shareholders have very little incentive to guard their ability
to influence management in times of financial distress.163 Individual shareholders
may find it more efficient to simply exit a failing firm. Investors buying the shares
of exiting shareholders may be those “vulture investors” known for investing in
struggling companies to turn a short-term gain. Those interests may not be in line
with the goal of long-term corporate wealth maximization.
Even if shareholders do have the proper incentives to resist strict loan
covenants, managers are not breaching their duties to shareholders or the
corporation by entering into the loan agreements discussed here. Because no duty
is breached, shareholders have very few tools at their disposal to object.164 The
least expensive means available to shareholders for expressing disapproval of a
corporate action is the sale of the corporation’s stock.165 The threat posed by
shareholder exit is much less meaningful in a financially distressed company when
the stock price is already depressed. Then, the stock price might already have
fallen so that the officers are effectively punished with the loss or devaluation of
incentive compensation, whether or not the poor financial condition is their doing.
While the appropriate message of shareholder disapproval may be sent by the
decline in stock price, the decline in price could also result from the decreased
value of the firm. Any angry shareholder exit may be masked by the decrease in
value of the corporation that originally caused the shareholder ire. At this point in
the corporation’s life, as the law now stands, the shareholders really are
162.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1250.
163.
Skeel, supra note 67, at 501; Henderson, supra note 24, at 1558.
164.
Even if shareholders would otherwise be tempted to bring derivative suits
against corporate directors on account of the loan terms or the effects of the loan agreements
in times of financial trouble, the shareholders, and, most importantly, their attorneys, are
less likely to pursue the derivative remedy in the zone of insolvency. Skeel, supra note 67,
at 501; Alces, supra note 97, at 122–23.
165.
Henderson, supra note 24, at 1558.
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powerless.166 For all of these reasons, the simple fact that shareholders have not
vocally and meaningfully objected to or prevented the adoption of loan terms
should not serve as dispositive evidence that such terms are in the shareholders’ or
the corporation’s best interests. Rather, it means that all of the relevant parties
assume the current shareholders will have exited by the time strict loan covenants
become effective, and so there is no need to protect equity interests as they may
exist upon that eventuality. No one will likely complain when the loan agreement
is negotiated, and it is too late to complain once the corporation is in financial
distress.
The chief problem caused by strong creditor control is the undermining of
managerial independence that occurs when any one group can exercise significant
control over managerial decision making. Shareholders should want to object to
loan terms that implicitly or explicitly give creditors more power over the
corporation than shareholders would be allowed to claim under state law. The
prevalence of such loan covenants effectively wrests control of the corporation
from shareholders before insolvency, and, certainly before bankruptcy. This
constrains managers to act to the advantage of creditors in a way shareholders
could never pressure managers to act. While the tools used by each constituency
must necessarily be different,167 they need not and should not be unequal in their
ability to reach management and their obligation to honor the independence of
managerial business judgment. It is only with the appropriate balances between
supervision and managerial independence and between shareholder authority and
creditor power that management will be free and encouraged to make the decisions
most likely to lead to corporate wealth maximization. Only then will the
appropriate level of risk be preferred.
Professor Barry Adler makes the point that companies that have reached
the end of the line and are abject failures would do better to liquidate than to
engage in a long, expensive reorganization process.168 Such “dead” companies
should liquidate, individually, sooner and, collectively, more often.169 But, if a
corporation still has long term prospects, still has a viable and potentially
profitable business model, and still could reasonably exist in a competitive market,
then the risk aversion that leads to the decision to cut the company’s losses and
either liquidate or file for bankruptcy is not necessarily the optimal level of risk
preference.170 Corporations that seek large cash loans either to continue to operate
or to pursue new opportunities in the hopes of turning the business around may
still have life and should not necessarily be governed by the degree of risk aversion
creditors would prefer. The same can be said of companies that renegotiate loans,
166.
This is another extension of the “vestigialization” principle introduced by
Skeel, which explains that state law corporate governance is ineffective for insolvent
corporations because state law was not built to address the problems and circumstances that
confront financially distressed companies. Skeel, supra note 67, at 489–92.
167.
Creditors could not, for example, offer managers incentive compensation
through shares in the corporation’s debt, at least not before bankruptcy.
168.
Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment
Incentives, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 597 (1995).
169.
Id.
170.
Skeel, supra note 24, at 937–38.
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agreeing to be bound by stricter covenants, in the hopes of reorganizing their debt
outside of bankruptcy. Such companies with long-term prospects and reasonable
hopes for profitability should still be taking more risks than creditors would
approve under cautious loan agreements. As long as a corporation is “alive,”
meaning financially viable, its risk preferences should tend more to risk-seeking
behavior than the absolute risk aversion that results from the combined risk
aversion of creditors and individual managers when a corporation faces financial
difficulty. Equity preferences still pertain, because it is still possible that an equity
position will exist in the future. Managers should still try to maximize corporate
wealth, above and beyond the company’s debt load, as long as the firm is not
liquidating with the sole objective of repaying creditors. Corporations may bounce
in and out of the zone of insolvency a few times without ever liquidating or
entering bankruptcy.171 Shutting down wealth-maximizing behaviors and risk
preferences may leave money on the table.
Too strong a risk preference would not be prudent either. Some caution
during troubled times is warranted lest the corporation’s reasonable hopes for
recovery and profitability be dashed. The goal is not to allow shareholder
preferences to grow in influence so as to overwhelm completely the risk aversion
of managers and creditors. Rather, it is to balance constituent powers of influence
so that neither can completely assert its will upon managers, thereby preserving
managerial independence to pursue corporate wealth maximization subject only to
removal by the board of directors.
C. Business Decisions in the Zone—The Cost of Lost Managerial Independence
Dominance by either shareholders or creditors when a corporation is in
financial trouble may deprive managers of the independence they need to make the
best investment decision for the corporation’s financial future and wealth
maximization. With Figure 1172 and its illustration of shareholder and creditor
preferences and influence each group can exert on managerial decision making
given the corporation’s risk of default in mind, consider the following example and
its conclusion about corporate wealth maximization. Recall that our fictional Firm
had two investment choices. Option A had a 100% chance of earning a $76 million
return. Option B is a riskier proposition, with only a 30% chance of success, but
carries a potential return of $150 million. Now suppose that a third option is
available and has an 80% chance of producing a $100 million return. Figure 2
illustrates the decision before management.

171.
The recent struggles of the American automotive companies outside of
bankruptcy demonstrate this point.
172.
See supra fig.1, at 1080.
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Figure 2
Option C, EVcorp = $80 million
Expected manager payoff = -1
Option A, EVcorp = $76 million
Expected manager payoff = 1
Manager

Shareholders treat poorly (1)

Option B, EVcorp = $45 million
Expected manager payoff = -.021

30% win
SH treat well (4)

Shareholders treat poorly (1)
1

70% lose
CR treat poorly (-2)

Creditors treat poorly (-2)

(0.3)(4) + (0.7)(-2) = -0.2

In this example, a rational manager will choose Option A even though
Option C has the highest expected return for the corporation. This is because,
considering their own best interests, neither creditors nor shareholders will prefer
Option C and so both will treat the manager poorly for choosing that option.
Option C has an expected value for shareholders of $20 million, as opposed to the
$22.5 million Option B offers. Option C has an expected value for creditors of $60
million, which would still leave them undersecured as Option A would not.
Because of the power creditors can yield, a rational manager would choose Option
A over Option B under these circumstances. If shareholders and creditors could
somehow pre-commit to treat the managers well, or at least to refrain from treating
the managers poorly were Option C chosen, then the managers would be free to
make the decision that accepts the appropriate amount of risk and carries the
highest expected value for the corporation.
This guaranteed soft landing for managers could take different forms.
There is always the chance that the investment choice fails and in order for
managers to take the risk anyway, the chance that they will be punished for taking
the risk must be reduced. The current system tends to push managers either further
toward complete risk aversion or toward the “nothing to lose” kind of risk
preference of shareholders in a highly leveraged company.173 The fiduciary duty
law that applies to directors has grown to protect directors from liability to either
creditors or shareholders for preferring the interests of either group, as long as the
173.

Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1231.
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directors made an informed decision with a good faith interest in doing what is
best for the corporation.174 Because other factors are at work in incentivizing and
supervising them, managers are not so protected. No good reason explains the lack
of protection, however, because we are as interested, if not more interested, in
senior officers’ feeling free to make the decision that is best for the corporation’s
wealth maximization, even if that decision will anger either shareholders or
creditors. Because the punishment of officers does not require court approval or a
litigant’s making it through the long and obstacle-ridden derivative suit process,
corporate policy and legal rules cannot protect them as easily. Rather, a true
balance of interests and powers between shareholders and creditors is most likely
to result in the freedom managers will need to make the best decision for the
corporation without particular reference to what decision either the creditors or
shareholders would prefer or demand. Part V of this Article describes how to
achieve this balance within the corporate decision making mechanism currently in
place.
Managers make difficult decisions when negotiating a loan agreement
that will significantly affect the company if it encounters financial difficulty. The
high rate of turnover among shareholders, and their relative inability to challenge
meaningfully the terms of a loan, means that their interests are not necessarily
accounted for when managers and creditors plan ahead for the possibility of the
corporation’s default or insolvency. The lopsided representation of creditors in
these circumstances may detract from managers’ ability to make wealthmaximizing decisions for the corporation in times of financial distress. A more
balanced representation of shareholder and creditor interests is needed to promote
wealth-maximizing objectives and to preserve managerial independence from the
whims of either constituency. The next Part explains how an equity trustee charged
with the task of representing shareholder interests upon the occurrence of certain
triggering events can help achieve the best balance.

V. CHANGING CORPORATE POLICY AND PRACTICE TO MAXIMIZE
WEALTH
The key to finding a balance in corporate decision making that will allow
the corporation’s bottom line to remain the primary focus and priority for officers
is to balance the power and influence shareholders and creditors can exercise over
the corporation throughout its life, but particularly when the company is in
financial trouble. The particular need for a seat at the table for shareholders arises
even as early as when the firm is thinking of entering into a significant credit
agreement with bank lenders. The most efficient and productive way to address the
competing pressures shareholders and creditors directly and indirectly place on
management is to move the debate out of the managers’ minds and into an open
negotiation between shareholders and creditors themselves, through their
designated representatives.

174.
See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930
A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns
Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).

2008]

STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE

1091

This Part of the Article explains what a shareholder representative, or
equity trustee, would do, when its duties would be triggered, and how the equity
trustee would be monitored. Corporate law and practice operate under the
assumption that the shareholders’ interests are represented by a firm’s officers and
directors.175 This may be true enough when the corporation is healthy, but the other
factors weighing on managers’ decision making become more pronounced when
the corporation endures financial difficulties. Silencing the shareholder voice and
perspective under these circumstances can result in taking risk aversion too far, so
that the corporation stops moving toward continued wealth maximization and
becomes too conservative in its investments. Conversely, leaving creditors
powerless during this time in some instances of a particularly strong equity
presence176 can be just as harmful, by leaving unchecked strong incentives for risk
preference.177 If shareholders and creditors can be brought together to negotiate
over the supervision of management going forward and what powers each will
have and be able to exercise over managerial decision making (and, in this
instance, less is more), then managers will feel free to make wealth-maximizing
decisions that might not be ideal from the standpoint of either constituency.
This Part will begin by looking briefly at why altering the current regime
of executive compensation is not the best way to adjust managerial incentives
appropriately. Next, it will describe how informed and concentrated shareholder
representation can work to balance effectively the power creditors have when a
corporation is highly leveraged. Creditors may decide to charge more for credit.
Shareholders may find that they are prepared to agree to higher interest rates in
exchange for the freedom they can retain for managers to make decisions that may
be more beneficial to shareholders. In the end, the goal should be to allow
monitoring of management that prevents bad faith or disloyal conduct, but also to
remember that managers owe loyalty to the corporation. Managers should not be
punished for making decisions motivated by the best interests of the corporation.178
175.
Shareholders choose the directors of the corporation through voting and thus
“[t]he directors and officers of a corporation independently owe fiduciary duties directly to
the stockholders.” Arnold v. Soc’y. for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., No. 12883, 1995 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 86, at *24 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
890 (Del. 1985)).
176.
Such a strong equity presence is most common in corporations where there is
a concentration of stockholding in one person or entity.
177.
This can arise when the dominant equity presence can protect the managers
and can provide or already has provided them with other employment opportunities if the
current corporation fails.
178.
Managers could still be removed in the ordinary course by directors who feel
that the officers are not particularly competent or are not exercising good judgment. As
Baird and Rasmussen point out, having the best person in office is more important than
aligning an officer’s individual incentives. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 39, at 931–32.
Prime Directive reveals that having too quick a trigger finger can be damaging by itself.
This Article maintains that corporate management can find the right answer for the
corporation by listening to and balancing the interests of all corporate constituencies.
Managers who are not making the best decisions for the corporation will still be removed
through the usual process and that process may operate more efficiently with the input of
shareholder and creditor representatives.
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Finally, this Part will describe exactly how the new position of a shareholder
representative can be created and what it would look like, including how to select,
pay, monitor, and appropriately incentivize the shareholder representative.
A. Why Executive Compensation Is Not the Answer
In the past, incentive compensation has served as the chief means to align
managers’ incentives with the interests of shareholders.179 If the managers’
compensation depends upon maximizing the corporation’s profits, then they will
have personal incentives to take actions consistent with that goal. Commentators
have recognized possible problems with this means of aligning incentives. For
instance, if managers’ compensation is based on enhanced earnings, then they will
have incentives to take actions that increase the amounts reported on “earnings
statements,” even if those same actions will have a negative impact on stock
price.180 Conversely, payment with options, which should serve to reward officers
for an increase in their firm’s stock price, may provide managers perverse
incentives by making them too risk-preferring, even more so than shareholders
would want them to be.181 We have learned from Enron, WorldCom, and other
accounting disasters that increased stock prices do not necessarily mean increased
corporate wealth.182 Shareholders have strong incentives to realize increased share
prices in the short term, while that interest may not serve corporate wealth
maximization.183 All of this demonstrates that incentive compensation can help to
179.
See William W. Bratton, Supersize Pay, Incentive Compatibility, and the
Volatile Shareholder Interest, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 55, 98–100 (2006) (arguing that
incentive compensation is designed to align managers with shareholders who want long
term financial growth as opposed to short term speculative shareholders); Marcel Kahan,
The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869,
1878 (2001) (“The main issue in corporate governance is therefore to create incentives for
managers to run the company in the interest of shareholders.”); Listokin, supra note 24, at
783 (In a solvent corporation the shareholders are the residual claimants and the fiduciary
duties of the managers are owed to the shareholder, but in bankruptcy it is not as easy to
identify the residual claimants. In many cases the unsecured creditor’s committee is the
residual claimant and they should be granted the right to give managers a percentage of the
unsecured debt. This mechanism would “enable the residual claimants to align the
incentives of the manager with their own.”).
180.
Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. 1976) (examining the
case of shareholders who brought a derivative suit against the directors because they chose
to issue a dividend instead of taking a loss on the earnings statement. The court dismissed
the suit for failure to state a claim and applied business judgment rule protection to the
decision of the board of directors.).
181.
Hu, supra note 20, at 318–32; Hu, supra note 46, at 1492–95.
182.
See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:
A Critique of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 8–9 (2003) (In the Enron
case the market failed to see that Enron was in fact not making money or acquiring wealth
but the stock price tended to reflect a healthy corporation. Even after the stock price
dropped by half, suggesting that the company was in trouble, the stock price was still much
higher than the worth of the corporation.).
183.
See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)
(The shareholders of Time brought an action to enjoin the merger of Paramount and Time
claiming that the Directors breached their fiduciary duties by not maximizing their short
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a point, but each variety of incentive compensation may still pervert managers’
incentives to work for overall corporate wealth maximization.
Beyond the basic inability to align managers’ incentives precisely with
the interests of the shareholders or the corporation, the bigger problem with
incentive compensation in financially distressed companies is that it often serves
either to make managers too risk-averse or too risk-seeking and fails to strike the
balance of risk preference that the corporation itself has184 as a distinct entity with
“best interests” of its own.185 The executive compensation scheme designed at the
outset for healthy companies focuses on aligning managers’ interests with those of
shareholders. The presumption at the time is that what is good for shareholders
will be good for the company. In the bankruptcy context, Professor Yair Listokin
has suggested that companies compensate managers with debt, essentially because
creditors have replaced shareholders as the residual claimants managers are
charged with serving.186 Professor Skeel has considered how to pay managers in
Chapter 11 to give them particular incentives, such as maximizing the wealth of
the estate or reorganizing the company as quickly as possible.187 It might seem,
then, at first blush, that the answer to the question of how to compensate managers
when the corporation is in trouble, but not yet in bankruptcy, is to give them some
incentive compensation that combines the solvent and bankruptcy approaches to
approximate the firm’s capital structure. The problem when the corporation is in
term shareholder value in the corporation. The court found that the directors did not have a
Revlon duty to maximize the shareholders short term value); Hu & Westbrook, supra note
4, at 1357–59.
184.
In financially distressed or bankrupt companies, creditors or vulture investors
take over and avail themselves of compensation plans that try to align managerial interests
with their own. Henderson, supra note 24, at 1572–78.
185.
See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ.
A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *33–34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (“At least where a
corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the
agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise”); Hu, supra
note 20, at 334–35 (noting that incentivizing too much can create “managerial
gamesmanship,” and entrench managers in the firm through overinvestment. On the other
hand, bonus related compensation will create incentives for managers to invest in short term
projects that create a profit, and not long term growth oriented endeavors because the profits
from these projects will not be realized in the present.).
186.
Listokin, supra note 24, at 803. Listokin writes:
Debt compensation aligns the incentives of managers with the incentives
of the typical residual claimants in bankruptcy—the unsecured creditors.
As a result, debt compensation encourages a manager to pursue actions
that are in her self-interest, while also improving the return of the
unsecured creditors. Just as grants of stock options and restricted stock
are believed to foster good behavior in managers of solvent firms, so too
does unsecured debt compensation promote value-maximizing behavior
in managers of bankrupt firms. This alignment of a manager’s incentives
with those of bankruptcy’s typical residual claimants makes debt
compensation an improvement upon other pay-for-performance plans
and proposals.
Id.
187.
Skeel, supra note 24, at 919, 927.
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financial trouble is not that the managers do not have enough at stake; it is, rather,
that they have their very livelihood to lose, and this causes them either to be too
risk-averse, which is more likely in a large, public corporation, or far too riskpreferring, more likely in a corporation in which equity is significantly
concentrated in one entity.188
Tying the managers’ personal wealth more closely to the corporation’s
serves only to misalign their incentives from those of the corporation’s constituent
parties. Recall that corporations are designed to be riskier endeavors than savings
accounts.189 If a manager will lose everything if the corporation goes under, or if
the shareholders are sufficiently angered, or if the creditors can declare a default,
he will be far more risk-averse in his decision making than the best financial
interests of the corporation would dictate.190 Therefore, making the manager’s
short-term interests depend too heavily on the corporation’s remaining afloat or
upon his making certain decisions will compromise his independent decision
making. That independent decision making is essential to looking objectively at
corporate choices and taking the course of action that will most likely enhance
corporate wealth, even without the express approval of shareholders or creditors.
Another possible solution is to give the manager the right to collect some
compensation in the future that depends on how well the corporation did during his
tenure. This only works, of course, if the corporation still exists after he leaves it.
If the corporation enters bankruptcy, the manager would receive a priority claim
for any back salary and an administrative claim for any salary earned during the
bankruptcy.191 The manager has an incentive to maximize corporate wealth in
order to collect on his claim. If the corporation does particularly well, either by
avoiding bankruptcy or by earning a significant sum in bankruptcy, the manager
will be able to collect on a greater percentage of his claim. The threat of being
removed from office by creditors inside or outside of bankruptcy may still weigh
more heavily on managers than whatever chance they may have of recovering
some or all of the salary the company owes them.192 Being removed by creditors
may adversely impact their chances of finding another managerial position with
another company and that next job may prove much more lucrative than whatever
income could be salvaged from the current company.193 Outside of bankruptcy, a
manager could be incentivized with a future approximation of the corporation’s
188.
See Hu, supra note 20, at 328 (“Shareholdings can exacerbate a problem of
inadequate diversification by managers and actually can make managers more reluctant to
choose appropriately risky projects.”).
189.
See id. at 320–22.
190.
Id.
191.
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2006).
192.
Adler, supra note 49, at 359 (explaining that managers favor reorganization
over liquidation, in part, because they want to keep their jobs).
193.
“[S]tudies have shown that the management that led the company into
financial distress is very often replaced, before or after the Chapter 11 petition is filed. For
those reasons, notwithstanding the DIP system, management may have substantial
incentives to resolve the debtor’s financial difficulties outside of bankruptcy.” Hu &
Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1377 (citing Barry E. Adler et al., Destruction of Value in the
New Era of Chapter 11, at 12, 29 (Oct. 24, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=795987).
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wealth during his term with an incentive-laden severance package or retirement
plan. This may still cause managers to remain too risk-averse and depends on the
corporation’s continued solvency of the corporation, something the manager may
not necessarily be able to control. All of these compensation alternatives are more
effective in healthy companies.194 They also keep the hypothetical bargaining
between the shareholder and creditor positions in a manager’s head, which
imposes a significant agency cost. Appointing an equity trustee may help to reduce
this agency cost and promote bargaining between the parties, by allowing a
shareholder representative to argue in favor of shareholder interests even when the
corporation is in trouble.
B. The Equity Trustee—A Seat at the Table for Shareholders
Giving shareholders informed, unified representation would leave
managers free to take the business risks most likely to lead to corporate wealth
maximization. A shareholder representative, or equity trustee, would be able to
provide balance against creditor power in a troubled company, so that creditor
influence does not dominate managerial decision making. An equity trustee would
achieve this balance by enhancing the other side of the payoff equation, and
specifically by curtailing the powers creditors reserve in loan covenants. Managers
who make bad judgments or who do not perform competently or faithfully can still
be removed by the board of directors. Even though the shareholders can exercise
their powers over management more effectively through a single representative,
those powers will remain limited by corporate law so that shareholders cannot
unduly force their preferences on management or make business decisions. The
very purpose of the equity trustee, as this Article conceives it, is to balance the
powers creditors assume so that managers will be more likely to maintain the
independence to make corporate wealth maximizing decisions.
A shareholder representative can only be effective in this role if the
creditor parties and management hear and respect the position he or she advocates.
At first blush, it may seem that the equity trustee would be as ignored as
shareholders typically are in this context. Further, it may seem that the equity
trustee simply creates new agency costs rather than alleviating others. This section
will show how bankruptcy practices can inform the design of an equity trustee that
will operate outside of bankruptcy in a way that will make that representative an
influential advocate in the negotiation of corporate debt. It will also demonstrate
the importance of defining the rights and responsibilities of the equity trustee so as
to ensure that it is a meaningful advocate for shareholder preferences both when
corporate debt is taken on and when the corporation is in the zone of insolvency, a
time when shareholder preferences may not have been properly defended in the
past.195

194.
195.

Henderson, supra note 24, at 1569, 1573–75.
Skeel, supra note 67, at 500–02.
[W]hile the shareholders of a healthy firm are its true residual owners
and, as a result, are the appropriate plaintiffs of a derivative suit outside
of bankruptcy, most corporations have become insolvent by the time
they file for bankruptcy. Because they have little financial interest in an
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1. How Bankruptcy Practices Can Be Instructive
Once a corporation enters bankruptcy, it is operated for the benefit of its
creditors.196 Creditors can exert significant control over a corporation in
bankruptcy, particularly through the committee of unsecured creditors (the
“creditors’ committee”) that is appointed in large, corporate bankruptcies. The
creditors’ committee represents the interests of the corporation’s unsecured
creditors and consists of the company’s seven largest unsecured creditors.197 In
most cases, when the debtor company is insolvent, the creditors’ committee
represents the residual claim. In cases where the company has or is likely to have
some equity remaining, the bankruptcy court will appoint an equity committee.198
The equity committee will represent the shareholder interests and is authorized to
take action within the bankruptcy case on the shareholders’ behalf.199 While
bankruptcy is admittedly a different beast because, for instance, managerial
authority in bankruptcy is seriously constrained by the bankruptcy court and the
influence of the representative committees,200 the use of equity committees in
bankruptcy and the success they enjoy,201 even when there is little or no equity
value remaining, may inform the potential utility of an equity trustee.
The U.S. Trustee appoints the seven largest equity security holders to the
equity committee.202 The equity committee members then select a team of
attorneys, accountants, and other professionals to represent the committee’s
interests in the bankruptcy case.203 An equity committee’s representatives are
compensated by the bankruptcy estate for its reasonable fees for actions it takes
that are helpful to the estate.204 The equity committee and the creditors’ committee
may both exercise significant control over the debtor and are granted a right of
access to important information about the debtor.205 The input of the committees
insolvent firm, and because most or all of any recovery would go to
higher priority claimants, shareholders lose much of their incentive to
promote and participate in derivative litigation.
Id. at 500–01. Skeel further comments that plaintiff’s attorneys, like the shareholders, also
lose incentives in bankruptcy because of the loss of control of the derivative litigation to the
bankruptcy court. Furthermore, derivative litigation can be seen as disruptive to the overall
reorganization process and the attorney will have to justify the litigation and the attorneys
fees to the bankruptcy judge. Id. at 501. A shareholder representative can give continuity
between stages of corporate existence and can be a useful tool for interested, sophisticated
shareholders.
196.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligation to Creditors, 17
CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 667 (1996).
197.
11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (2006).
198.
Id. § 1102(a)(1).
199.
Id. § 1103(c).
200.
Alces, supra note 97, at 134–39.
201.
See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity’s
Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 125, 138–39 (1990).
202.
11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2).
203.
Id. § 1103(a).
204.
Id. § 503(b)(1)(D)(3).
205.
Section 1103(c) of the Bankruptcy Code states:
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cannot be ignored by the debtor in possession (DIP) or trustee because both
committees will have to vote on and approve any plan of reorganization,206 and
both can move to appoint a trustee if they think the DIP, meaning the debtor’s
current management, is behaving fraudulently or incompetently.207 Equity
committees are not ignored when the plan is being formulated or when the estate’s
assets are being distributed to its claimants, even when the company is
insolvent.208
In an empirical study on the subject, Professors Lynn LoPucki and
William Whitford discovered that debtor and creditor attorneys agreed to provide
some degree of return to equity holders even when they had no legal right to a
portion of the estate’s assets.209 The reason appears to be that the lawyers
representing the corporate debtors, members of creditors committees, and equity
committees interact professionally on a regular basis and so are engaged in a
continuing game of sorts.210 Game theory dictates that repeat players will treat one
another fairly, or, in these cases, perhaps more than fairly, because they hope to
receive the same treatment from the others in the future.211 All of these elements of
equity representation can be transported out of bankruptcy and adapted to the zone
of insolvency situation, or circumstances in which the corporation’s debt structure
may significantly change in order to allow shareholders’ interests to be represented
in an effective, informed, sophisticated, and cohesive way.

A committee appointed under section 1102 of this title may –
(1) consult with the trustee of debtor in possession concerning
the administration of the case;
(2) investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and
financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business
and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other
matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan;
(3) participate in the formulation of a plan, advise those
represented by such committee of such committee’s determinations as to
any plan formulated, and collect and file with the court acceptances or
rejections of a plan;
(4) request the appointment of a trustee or examiner under
section 1104 of this title; and
(5) perform such other services as are in the interest of those
represented.
Id.
206.
TABB, supra note 101, at 807.
207.
11 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
208.
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 201, at 138.
209.
Id. at 194–95 (explaining that shareholders exert pressure on the debtor’s
counsel (through threatened litigation or simply through threats of professional
awkwardness and estrangement) so that the debtor’s counsel feels obligated to give the
shareholders a cut of the estate’s assets).
210.
Id.
211.
DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 5, at 265.

1098

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 50:1053

2. The Mechanics of the Equity Trustee
The equity trustee is modeled on the indenture trustee in bond
issuances212 and the equity committee in bankruptcy. An indenture trustee
represents the interests of widely dispersed bondholders upon certain named events
in the life of the indenture agreement. Shareholder opinions have long been
silenced and largely ignored, because shareholders in public corporations not only
are rationally apathetic,213 but also generally lack the business experience and
access to the detailed corporate information necessary to make informed, wellreasoned decisions about corporate business.214 While managerial independence in
decision making should still be the paramount object of corporate governance laws
and practices, there is a way for shareholders to have the same kind of
sophisticated, informed representation creditors enjoy when necessary. The equity
trustee must be designed so that it can be an effective advocate of shareholder
interests, is well-monitored, and has the right incentives. This section will discuss
how the equity trustee would be chosen and compensated, and considers possible
creditor objections to its existence.
An equity trustee would be appointed by a committee of the corporation’s
seven largest equity holders as measured at a certain time each year.215 Many
professional companies could decide to offer equity trustee services. Corporate
consulting companies come to mind as particularly qualified. Investment banks
could also form divisions to offer these services, as could large, institutional
investors.216 As with any other professional representative, the equity trustee
would be empowered to retain lawyers, accountants, and other professionals to aid
in its representation of a corporation’s shareholders. Like an indenture trustee, the
equity trustee would monitor the corporation and remain informed as to its
financial condition and important business decisions and capital structure, ready to
spring into action when its agreement with the corporation requires it. Because the
shareholders in public corporations are so diffuse and change daily, an agreement
with “the shareholders” as a distinct body is infeasible. The equity trustee would
have to enter an agreement with and receive compensation from the corporation on
the shareholders’ behalf. This does make the equity trustee a creditor of the
212.
In fact, scholars have suggested replacing traditional indenture trustees with
a supertrustee that would represent all public debt in many of the same ways the equity
trustee suggested in this Article would represent shareholders. Yakov Amihud et al., A New
Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 447 (1999).
213.
See Rock, supra note 64, at 455–56.
214.
Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
605, 625–26 (2007).
215.
Some institutional shareholders and scholars have suggested the use of
shareholder committees to advise management on various aspects of corporate business.
The suggestions have been met with hostility by management, but interest from
shareholders. All of the committees would have enhanced shareholder powers or would
have involved more direct shareholder involvement in business decisions. Rock, supra note
64, at 490–503. The equity trustee I propose avoids those potentially costly pitfalls.
216.
Proxy advisors, who work to compile information about companies and to
make voting recommendations to institutional investors, may also be able to adapt their
businesses to the demands of the equity trustee trade.
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corporation, but gives the equity trustee priority in bankruptcy.217 While it may
seem that paying the equity trustee in the same way as managers and making the
trustee a creditor of the corporation compromises the equity trustee’s loyalties, one
should keep in mind that the equity trustee would owe enforceable fiduciary duties
to the shareholders and no other constituents. The equity trustee will not be
protected by a business judgment rule or other procedural shields available to
directors. An equity trustee really would be an employee of the shareholders and
would be directly accountable to and removable by them. Shareholders would not
rely on payment of the equity trustee to align its incentives or monitor it and equity
trustees would care more about the overall success of its business, measured by the
satisfaction of the shareholders it serves, than it would about the recovery of a
particular fee.
The equity trustee I propose is not a mandatory one. It is created by
private contracts between the corporation and its shareholders, as well as the
corporation and the appointed equity trustee. Shareholders may demand that a
corporation provide them an equity trustee and may find that the best way to force
the managers to use the equity trustee as they intend is to amend the bylaws to
require the appointment of a trustee and to allow the trustee to have certain
representative powers at enumerated times. These bylaw amendments would
constitute the agreement between the shareholders and corporation about how an
equity trustee will be used. The corporation, through its management, will then
negotiate an agreement with the equity trustee, which will be subject to approval
by the group of shareholders responsible for choosing the trustee.
Shareholders should anticipate that the corporation would spend money to
provide them an enhanced presence and independent voice in the corporation
within the zone of insolvency, particularly if such a presence will prove beneficial
to the corporate enterprise as a whole. The presence of an equity trustee may
comfort shareholders and minimize precipitous declines in share price upon bad
financial news and may prevent such a decline in the face of enhanced debt or debt
reorganization negotiations. Exiting shareholders may realize more on the sale of
their stock on account of the services the equity trustee has provided. The presence
of an equity trustee may also make it more likely that a company that should
liquidate would actually do so because it has pushed the corporation to continue to
take business risks rather than fold into a position of purely conserving assets for
reorganization. This may provide efficiency from which investors as a whole
would benefit. Further, large shareholders, particularly those who invest in
troubled companies, may grow to insist on equity trustee representation. They may
benefit from the similar kind of informed representation creditors enjoy when the
corporation is in trouble. An equity trustee that has been paying attention to the
corporation for a long time may prove a valuable asset to “vulture investors,” who
buy stock in the company in the final stages before bankruptcy. The enhanced
information available to and analyzed for shareholders may allow investors to
217.
The equity trustee would at least receive priority as a corporate employee for
fees earned 180 days before the bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2006). To the
extent the equity trustee continues to serve after the bankruptcy filing, it could receive
administrative priority. Id. § 503(b).

1100

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 50:1053

make better investment decisions, and allow the market to identify more accurately
companies with the potential for future profits and those without it.
Creditors, however, are not likely to be so sanguine about allowing the
corporation to incur an additional expense for the benefit of shareholders,
particularly one they see as posing a direct threat to their repayment and control
when the corporation has limited resources. Creditors are unlikely to endorse any
action that would enhance management consideration of shareholders. Still,
creditors would not stop lending in the face of the use of an equity trustee. Banks
need to lend to large corporations as much as public firms in financial distress need
to borrow. They may, however, respond by increasing the price they charge for
credit. That response would impose an additional cost on the corporation, a cost
that may be directly associated with the creation of an equity trustee, insofar as the
trustee’s work limits the control over the corporation creditors can reserve in loan
covenants. Shareholders may choose to allow this extra cost, or the equity trustee
may recommend that they do so because paying additional interest may be
preferable to allowing creditors to take disproportionate control over the
management of the corporation in troubled times.
This tradeoff becomes particularly palatable if we accept that the
existence of an equity trustee means that shareholders should not necessarily give
up their shares when a corporation experiences financial difficulty. There are two
reasons shareholders may retain their investment if an equity trustee is present.
First, the equity trustee could represent their interests during that difficult time, so
that shareholder powers do not become irrelevant to managers and hope of
shareholder returns in the zone of insolvency is enhanced. Second, balancing
creditor and shareholder powers serves to lower the cost of corporate financial
difficulty to shareholders and managers alike. Managers will have greater job
security; shareholders will have less risk-averse managers at the helm of their
company and, therefore, a better potential for higher returns. Even if banks insist
upon charging onerous interest rates, corporations may decide to issue more public
debt as an alternative to borrowing from institutional lenders. If this is the case, the
bondholders will benefit from the presence of an indenture trustee. The
shareholders should enjoy the same advantage in the form of their equity trustee.
Preserving the importance of shareholder interests in troubled times should prevent
managers from agreeing to give the store to creditors upon the occurrence of
“material adverse effects” or broadly defined events of default.218 Limiting creditor
power aligns managers’ incentives with the goal of corporate wealth
maximization.

218.
Creating a “highly leveraged capital structure” imposes a duty to pay
principal and interest payments and thus limits or constrains managers in their decision
making and allows shareholders or equity holders to retain some control. See Larry E.
Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1431, 1468 (2006) (citing Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 323 (1986)).
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3. The Equity Trustee’s Role and Duties
The equity trustee will represent shareholder interests when the
corporation negotiates or reorganizes major loans and when the corporation
experiences financial difficulty. This is achieved several ways. First, the equity
trustee will participate in loan negotiations to make recommendations about the
use of covenants and the definition of events of default. An equity trustee may
only be necessary when the corporation is in financial trouble, reorganizes its loan
obligations, or negotiates loans considered risky by lenders. If creditors can
discern objectively what a risky loan is, the corporation should be able to use the
same measures to define by bylaw and agreement when a loan negotiation will
require the presence of an equity trustee. Second, the equity trustee will either
approve the agreement reached or inform the corporation’s shareholders of its
disapproval and the grounds therefore. Third, when the corporation reorganizes its
capital structure or is in perilous financial waters, the equity trustee will be entitled
to all of the financial disclosures creditors receive, and will have responsibility for
communicating its impressions of the corporation’s financial position and the
effectiveness of management to shareholders. Fourth, if the equity trustee believes
the directors or officers are breaching their fiduciary duties to the corporation or
shareholders, it can sue on the shareholders’ behalf. Fifth, the equity trustee will be
able to launch proxy contests to seek and vote shareholder proxies at shareholder
meetings. This will give the equity trustee a powerful influence in the election of
directors who, in turn, choose corporate officers without unnecessarily increasing
the shareholders’ legal entitlements to power over corporate management.
Corporations will require an equity trustee’s services in certain, specifically
defined circumstances.
4. When the Equity Trustee Is Triggered
For the purposes of this Article, the equity trustee is a device corporations
would use when certain circumstances are present that may compromise
shareholder interests in favor of those of creditors. I save for another day the
question of whether an equity trustee could be used at other times in a
corporation’s life. Even though the equity trustee will only actively participate in
corporate affairs upon the occurrence of certain events, it may be necessary to
designate a trustee before the triggers occur. This keeps a well-informed equity
trustee at the ready, able to assert itself when its contract so designates. The only
other alternative is for shareholders to require the corporation to notify them of the
occurrence of triggering events so that they can find and appoint an equity trustee.
If an equity trustee is not named before its duties are triggered, managers may not
be forthcoming about when an equity trustee could be used, and shareholders may
find out too late. This section of the Article discusses two circumstances under
which an equity trustee would be particularly useful. The first is negotiation of
major loan agreements and the second is when the corporation experiences serious
financial difficulty as defined in the equity trustee’s agreement or in the
corporation’s equity trustee provision.
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Recall that the initial business risk at issue is the decision to enter into the
loan and agree to strict covenants.219 In such situations, one may argue that
management is the shareholder representative. That may be true insofar as the
managers are deciding to take a business risk by borrowing money to make an
investment they believe will enhance corporate wealth. The managers appear to
make the risk-preferring decision for shareholders at that point. If the investment
succeeds, the company can repay the loan with cash to spare, and if it fails, the
current shareholders will not be around to complain about the creditor control.
This failure to account for the shareholder position and the representation of their
preferences if the company fails leads to the problem this Article seeks to
address.220 Managers act on the good-faith, but mistaken, belief that they can
ignore a separate set of shareholder preferences simply because the creditors
would take over as residual claimants.221
The shareholder preferences are different and very valuable when the
corporation is in trouble. Providing the shareholders a sophisticated, informed
representative to participate in corporate decision making when the corporation’s
debt is set to change or become an issue will serve to balance the creditor interests
and potential powers. There are two advantages to this approach. First, creditors
will not be able to exercise more power over managerial decision making than
shareholders could. Second, shareholder preferences and the benefits of the
investment risks they would support are not lost when the corporation is in
financial trouble, because a shareholder representative will remain actively
interested in advocating and litigating on behalf of shareholder interests, if
necessary, long after equity’s value has seriously declined. This balance will allow
managers to make the decision they honestly believe to be in the best interests of
the corporation without fear of retribution from either shareholders or creditors,
and will allow managers to exercise independent decision making authority under
only the supervision of the board of directors. This is the decision making model
corporate law has identified as most profitable.222 No good reason exists for
creditors to dominate managerial decision making, and there is no reason to
219.
See supra Part IV.A.
220.
Henry Hu suggests that corporations appoint a committee of directors to
particularly represent the investment preferences of shareholders. Hu, supra note 20, at
367–70. This acknowledges the need for a voice that is particularly devoted to shareholder
investment interests, even when a corporation is solvent. Asking a director to change his
allegiance, though, from one owing to the corporation as a whole to one devoted
particularly to shareholder interests may pose problems. However, I do not recommend
changing the fiduciary duties owed by directors or how directors should exercise those
duties. Rather, I propose the creation of a separate shareholder representative who can work,
without fear of litigation or conflicting interests, entirely for the representation of
shareholder preferences in times of financial difficulty.
221.
Hu & Westbrook, supra note 4, at 1344.
222.
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors . . . .”); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[The business
judgment rule] is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company.”).
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believe that such dominance would serve to maximize corporate wealth, because
maximization of corporate wealth beyond the point of creditor repayment is not in
the creditors’ best interests.
The equity trustee will serve to represent the shareholders when corporate
debt arrangements are made or altered, and will also be a shareholder
representative when the corporation is in the zone of insolvency. The presence of
the equity trustee in the zone of insolvency will keep the shareholder voice from
falling out of the corporate decision making process and will provide a shareholder
representative that has a continued incentive to represent the equity interest even
when the value of the equity position is very low or worthless. Because this Article
seeks to solve the problems caused by increased managerial risk aversion in the
zone of insolvency, I propose to limit the equity trustee to this time in a
corporation’s life. The zone of insolvency is, of course, difficult to define. Each
corporation must do so in a way most appropriate for it, much in the same way
they define default with creditors. Perhaps a corporation enters the zone if it does
not meet earnings expectations or if it climbs above a certain debt to equity ratio or
if a certain percentage of the firm’s assets are hypothecated as collateral on a loan.
The contours of the zone of insolvency may vary by company or industry, and I
will leave it to the appropriately trained professionals to define it for each
agreement. Like an indenture trustee on a bond issuance, the equity trustee will
receive periodic disclosures from the corporation and remain apprised of its
financial condition and major decisions, but will only participate in corporate
negotiations when the company’s capital structure may change in a significant
way, when the corporation plans to take on substantial additional debt or
reorganize old debt, or when the firm is experiencing financial difficulty.
5. Why the Equity Trustee Is Effective
One of the more persistent arguments against shareholder activism is that
shareholders are relatively unsophisticated and uninformed, and they cannot act
with a single, unified voice.223 Creditors do not have that problem. Appointing a
shareholder representative to remain informed about corporate affairs gives the
shareholders a single, unitary, sophisticated voice in communicating with
management. The use of such a representative moots any advantages creditors may
223.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting
Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 626 (2006). Bainbridge writes:
Active investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking seems likely to
disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation
practicable; namely, the centralization of essentially nonreviewable
decisionmaking authority in the board of directors. The chief economic
virtue of the public corporation is not that it permits the aggregation of
large capital pools, as some have suggested, but rather that it provides a
hierarchical decisionmaking structure well-suited to the problem of
operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees,
managers, shareholders, creditors, and other inputs. . . . Shareholder
activism necessarily contemplates that institutions will review
management decisions, step in when management performance falters,
and exercise voting control to effect a change in policy or personnel.
Id.
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have in monitoring corporate governance. A shareholder representative available
to participate in the negotiation of significant credit agreements and to represent
the shareholder position even after equity has little or no value, will allow the
shareholders to prevent creditors from exercising undue control over management,
and will also promote the best interests of corporate wealth maximization, even
after specific shareholders have exited the firm. The continuity of the shareholder
position that a shareholder representative can provide, can serve to enhance
corporate wealth. That only works, of course, if the shareholder representative’s
voice is one management cannot ignore.
One may ask why we would expect managers or creditor representatives
to give any credence to a shareholder representative, particularly in light of the fact
that the equity trustee has no directly exercisable authority over corporate
management and the powers the trustee could wield are based on the very limited
and indirect powers afforded shareholders. The effectiveness of equity committees
in bankruptcy, even where the corporation is insolvent and no equity remains,
demonstrates how successful a respected professional can be in negotiating some
concessions for his client.224 Of course, the fact that an equity trustee may have the
power to motivate shareholders to exercise their voting rights, to sue management
derivatively, or to rally public opinion against a certain company’s management,
makes the trustee’s voice impossible to ignore completely. The equity trustee
eliminates the shareholders’ traditional weakness as a corporate constituency
caused by their wide dispersal, inability to confer with each other, and rational
apathy.225 An equity trustee that can summon the power of the shareholders,
though effectively and legally limited, is a force to be reckoned with.
There may be some concern that we should not encourage a system in
which shareholders are able to receive benefits to which they are not legally
entitled, just because they have a particularly effective representative. This is not a
valid concern for two reasons. First, creditors have been able to, and have made
quite a business out of, effectively reserving for themselves powers that would
lead to lender liability226 if those powers were explicitly reserved to them or
exercised. While this Article argues that such powers are not warranted, they are
indeed the effect of rigorous bargaining by the interested parties. This Article does
not argue that such agreements should be outlawed but, rather, suggests that the
parties can reach a more efficient agreement, and one more beneficial to the
corporation in the long run, if another constituent’s—the shareholders’—interests
are more fully considered and actively represented. Second, if, through open
bargaining with creditors and managers, shareholders can extract benefits they
could not otherwise demand under state law, there is nothing in that outcome that
is inconsistent with the tenets or goals of Delaware corporate law, and such a result
is likely efficient if it is the product of fair, arm’s length bargaining. Such creative
bargaining should be favored above agreements imposed on parties by inflexible
state law considered and enacted ex ante. As the Coase Theorem tells us, if
224.
LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 201, at 194−95. See supra text
accompanying notes 209−11.
225.
Rock, supra note 64, at 453−64.
226.
Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 1, at 1235–36.
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transaction costs are low, parties will devise an optimal rule through bargaining.227
Let us now turn to a discussion of the transaction costs imposed by the equity
trustee.
6. Another Agent to Monitor
There could be concern that an equity trustee would raise the costs
associated with entering loan agreements and operating the company in the zone of
insolvency. The proposition adds yet another agent with its own, unique agency
costs. Nevertheless, it lowers the agency costs associated with managerial
uncertainty and misaligned incentives in times of financial difficulty. The equity
trustee is a more closely monitored agent and owes fiduciary duties directly to
shareholders. Shareholders know that their interests and only their interests will be
represented by the equity trustee. In many ways, the fiduciary duties owed by a
trustee to one, identifiable beneficiary—here, the equity position228—are easier to
enforce than corporate fiduciary duties because of the procedural barriers to
shareholder derivative suits that Delaware corporate law has erected. While
corporate fiduciary duties have been analogized to the duties owed by trustees, the
analogy is not perfect, and enforcing fiduciary duties against traditional trustees is
easier than enforcing the same duties against corporate managers who have the
benefit of a business judgment rule and a prohibitive litigation scheme. In this
way, shareholders could use fiduciary duties to monitor an equity trustee much less
expensively and more effectively than they can use the same principles to monitor
managers in the first place. Furthermore, the equity trustee will owe fiduciary
duties specifically to the shareholders and only to the shareholders. Corporate
managers, on the other hand, owe duties to the entire corporate enterprise and so it
has become increasingly clear that shareholders cannot use the fiduciary
mechanism to defend their position and preferences alone.229 The bargaining the
managers, creditors, and equity trustee will engage in will lower the agency costs
associated with trusting that negotiation to the indirectly conferred incentives
enjoyed by management. By adding an equity trustee, we add an agent directly
monitored by and responsible to shareholder interests—an agent who lowers the
overall agency costs associated with leaving managerial decision making exposed
to the possibility of significant creditor control.
Further, equity trustees will likely have a number of corporate or
corporate−shareholder clients, just like other professionals retained by
corporations. This means that various equity trustees would work to build a
reputation in the market and would place a high value on maintaining a favorable
reputation that is likely to bring more work their way. The importance of their
reputation to their ultimate success would serve as a strong check on the agency
227.
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
228.
See Hu, supra note 20, at 288–89 (Though many shareholders make up the
collective equity interest, the shareholder interest may nevertheless be identified as a
singular “beneficiary.”).
229.
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 298 (1999) (“Corporate law only permits shareholders
to bring successful derivative claims against directors in circumstances where bringing such
claims benefits not only shareholders, but other stakeholders in the coalition as well.”).
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costs associated with any kind of fiduciary relationship. Shareholders could
obviously sue an equity trustee for breach of fiduciary duty, but the more effective
and less expensive check on equity trustee power and incentives will be the
importance of an equity trustee’s reputation to his, her, or its success on the
market.230 Granted, reputational constraints are not perceived as being very
forceful in the wake of the failures of accountants and SEC analysts whose
concerns about reputation did not prevent wrongdoing in the case of Enron. An
equity trustee’s incentives are tied less to the success of the corporation and more
to the quality of representation the shareholders get. An equity trustee needs to
demonstrate to the market that it is a good monitor, that it effectively
communicates important information to shareholders, and that it gives good advice
and effectively uses the tools available to it for disciplining management.
Furthermore, because, for the purposes of this Article, an equity trustee becomes
more active when the corporation is in financial trouble, its reputation will not
depend on how well the company appears to be doing to the market. In this way,
its reputation will not be as dangerously tied to management’s success as those
involved in the Enron disaster. An equity trustee’s success is also tied to reputation
because it depends in part on how effective the equity trustee is in negotiating with
managers and creditors on the shareholders’ behalf. Only an equity trustee that
commands the respect of the leaders in the corporate governance and financial
marketplaces will be an effective representative for shareholders.

CONCLUSION
Managers of financially distressed companies face competing interests in
deciding how best to operate the firm while also trying to keep their jobs. Creditors
can exercise significant control over how a company in the zone of insolvency is
run, while shareholders choose to exit the firm and so do not exert their will as
forcefully. The loss of the shareholder voice can result in a loss of managerial
incentives to make value-maximizing decisions, as already risk-averse managers
become even more cautious under the watchful eyes of creditors. Providing a
shareholder advocate in the form of an equity trustee to represent equity
preferences when a corporation is in severe financial trouble or reorganizes its debt
or capital structure can provide a balance against the significant powers reserved
by creditors, so that managers remain free to make investment decisions that will
maximize corporate wealth.

230.
Whether an equity trustee should be an individual (as a bankruptcy trustee is)
or a company or institution (like indenture trustees are) is not certain. The exact formulation
of an equity trustee business and the most effective combination of credentials and
experience for an equity trustee is left to another article.

